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CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE CREDIT
CARD INDUSTRY: FEDERAL
LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS
John C. Weistart'-1
!.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE CREDIT CARD PROBLEM
A.

The Expansion of Credit Card Markets

REDIT cards have been used as a means of facilitating delayedpayment purchases since early in this century. The first credit
card systems were operated by retailers and service organizations in
connection with the merchandising of their products. While such
programs were used in local markets by department stores,1 oil companies were the first issuers to recognize the potential of credit card
plans in larger geographical areas. 2 In the early 1950's a new phase
in credit card development evolved with the emergence of firms engaging solely in the extension of credit. These firms-Diners' Club,
American Express, and Hilton Credit Corporation with its Carte
Blanche system-sold no merchandise, but rather enlisted a nationwide system of retail, service, and travel establishments to make
credit sales to their cardholders. 8 The convenience of a single card
that could be used for a variety of goods and services stimulated
considerable consumer interest. Since each issuer of a multipurpose
card potentially could reach a greater share of the credit card market,
competition throughout the industry intensified.
The efforts of the new, independent issuers were concentrated
upon the solicitation of accounts, the evaluation of cardholder credit
standing, and the development of centralized accounting and pro-

C

• Associate Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1965, Illinois Wesleyan University; J.D. 1968, Duke University.-Ed.
I. See Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 VAL,
U. L. REv. 218 (1967); Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal
Infant, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 459, 460 (1960). The first credit devices used by local retailers
were metal discs, termed credit coins, stamped with the name of the merchant and the
customer's account number. See Jones Store v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, !)6 S.W.2d 681
(1931); Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (1923); Wanamaker v, Chase, 81
Pa. Super. 201 (1923); Wanamaker v. Mcgary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Philadelphia Mun. Ct,
1915). The credit coin is discussed in Note, Implied Contract-Credit Coins and CardsNegotiability, 2 U. PilT. L. REv. 117 (1936).
2. Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND, & CoM, L,
REv. 485 (1967). The majority of the oil companies operated regionally in the 1920's,
Reciprocal arrangements among companies were established in order to render their
cards usable in areas of the country not serviced by the issuer.
3. See generally id.; Davenport, supra note I, at 218-19; Comment, supra note 1,
at 461-62; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, REPORT: BANK CREDIT•
CARD AND CHECK-CREDIT PLANS 7 (1968) [hereinafter FED. REsERVE SYS, REP.].
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cessing systems. Since these functions are closely related to services
provided by traditional financial institutions, it is not surprising
that banks undertook to create their mm credit card systems. In
addition, pressure £or bank entry into the industry resulted from the
direct competition that nonbank issuers provided as their cardholders substituted card credit £or short-term, high interest personal
bank loans. Although a few small banks initiated credit card programs in the early 1950's,4 the first broad-based bank credit card
systems appeared at the end of the decade with the establishment
of the Bank of America system on the West Coast5 and the Chase
Manhattan program in the Northeast. 6
Despite the large scale of many systems sponsored by retailer~
issuers, credit cards attracted little legislative attention until the
1960's. The early statutes were state enactments responsive to industry requests £or clarification of the applicability of criminal laws
to credit card misuse. 7 However, the industry itself, and the legal
4. See Davenport, supra note 1, at 219 n.3; Robinson, New Developments in Retail
Financing, 8 KAN. L. R.Ev. 554, 567 (1960). In 1951, the Franklin National Bank of
Franklin Square, N.Y., became the first bank in the United States to adopt a credit
card plan. By late 1958, approximately 100 smaller banks also had such programs. Wall
St. J., Jan. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 6. While most of these small banks entered the field with
expectations of high profits, one half of them discontinued the service after a short
period. FED. REsERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, at 7.
5. See Davenport, supra note 1, at 219; Comment, supra note 1, at 462-63. While
the Diners' Club, American Express and Carte Blanche cards attempted to attract the
travel and entertainment charges of a professional and business clientele, the Bank of
America plan was directed to more general consumer use. Bank card plans developed
more rapidly on the West Coast than in other areas. By September 1967, nearly one
half of the 400,000 business establishments honoring bank credit cards were in the
San Francisco (Twelfth) Federal Reserve District. FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3,
at 9, 11. See also Johnston, Credit and Credit Cards, in BANKING MARKETS AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 252, 263 (1971).
6. Following the lead of Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank began a credit
card plan in late 1958. It did not achieve the rate of growth originally expected, in
part due to the reluctance of large department stores in New York City to relinquish
their already well-established credit systems. See FED. REsERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3,
at 7-8. As a result, in 1962 Chase Manhattan sold its credit card system, Uni-Serv Corporation. It was eventually purchased by American Express in 1965. Chase Manhattan's
expressed interest in re-entering the credit card industry with the purchase of Diners'
Club in 1966 was discouraged when the Justice Department proposed to review the
antitrust implications of the action. Wall St. J., May 24, 1966, at 32, cols. 1, 2-3.
7. Once credit card misuse became of national importance, problems emerged when
existing state criminal statutes were invoked against cardholders and unauthorized
users. Since only a small charge was required to obtain the card, and the card was
nontransferable by its terms, it seemed incongruous to value it by the number of
purchases that could have been made with it. This raised problems in categorizing the
use of a stolen credit card as grand or petit theft. Furthermore, when the credit card
was signed by the user, it became a contract between the issuer and the user, which
was thereafter incapable of being stolen. In addition, courts that first confronted the
credit card problem were often confused as to whether the unauthorized use was larceny, forgery or obtaining property under false pretenses. See Note, Credit-Credit
Cards-Civil and Criminal Liability for Unauthorized or Fraudulent Use, 35 NOTRE
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relationships that it created, remained largely unregulated until
adoption of amendments to the federal Truth-in-Lending Act in
1970.8
The growth of bank card systems during the mid-1960's primarily
accounts for the change in legislative attitude. The Chase Manhattan
and Bank of America card systems had established the compatability
of credit card and banking practices, and the banking industry itself
had developed a more aggressive, less risk-conscious outlook. Banks,
once typified by their emphasis upon business accounts, devoted
more attention to increasing their personal accounts through expanded consumer services. In addition, banks already had associations that provided a firm foundation for launching a card program.
Merchants who had accounts with a bank would be inclined to
accept the bank's credit card in order to centralize their financial
affairs. Similarly, individuals who had accounts with the bank were
likely prospects as cardholders. A bank's reputation for financial
stability and quality business management gave it an advantage
over nonbanking firms in enlisting other merchants and cardholders.
However, as banks readied to move into credit card plans, they
realized that competition was likely to be severe. In large cities,
there were usually several banks with resources sufficient to finance
the initiation of a card system. At the same time, the older merchandising credit plans of the oil companies and similar firms, faced
with consumer resistance to the inconvenience of single-product
cards, were expanded to allow multiple uses. Cards that formerly
could be used only for petroleum products and automotive services
and accessories were reformed to cover purchases in the broader
travel and entertainment areas.

B.

The Chicago Experience

The forces leading to expansion of the credit card industry in
the mid-1960's were not sufficient to prompt legislation limiting the
LAw. 225, 235-40 (1960); Comment, Criminal Liability for the Unauthorized Use
of a Credit Card, 7 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 158 (1962). This confusion led to state statutes
that made it a crime to purchase goods by means of a credit card that had been
stolen or bad expired. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-1901 (1964); FLA, STAT, ANN,
§ 817.481 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.52, .545, .785 (Supp.
1972); TEx. PEN. CoDE ANN. §§ 1555b-c (Supp. 1972). See also Hearings on H.R. 12646
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Scss. 39.54 (1967)
[hereinafter 1967 House Hearings].

DAME

8. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. V, 84 Stat. 1126, amending Truth-inLending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-8lt (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 16020)-(o), 1642-44
(1970), set out in note 34 infra).

August 1972]

Federal Control of Credit Cards

1479

growth of the industry. The number of issuers of multipurpose cards
was still limited, and many segments of the population had not yet
been attracted to credit card use. However, the efforts by new issuers to capture these lucrative markets produced conditions that
ultimately prompted congressional concern. The event that provided
the primary impetus for legislative inquiry into the credit card industry was the initiation of the Midwest Bank Card System by several
Chicago banks in the latter part of 1966 and the early months of
1967.
The Midwest Bank Card System was a cooperative venture of
five issuers for the exchange of charge receipts from credit card
transactions. 0 Although each issuer sought to enroll merchants into
its particular plan, the card of any issuer in the system would be
honored by all merchants who had agreed to participate in any one
of the individual plans-an arrangement that substantially increased
the convenience of each card. The profitability of each plan was
dependent upon the issuer's ability to attract a large volume of cardholders, many of whom would also be solicited by the other issuing
banks in the system.
The Chicago program was the first undertaken in a highly competitive market. Banks in other cities had secured cardholders and
participating merchants from their existing customers without significant difficulty. However, since branch banking is prohibited by
Illinois law, 1° Chicago banks realized that solicitations directed only
to existing personal and merchant accounts would not produce the
volume and geographical diversity necessary to secure maximum
market impact in the metropolitan Chicago area; as a consequence,
the issuers sought to increase the scope of their marketing operation
beyond their existing customers. Cardholder-use patterns provided
additional competitive pressure. Customer loyalty was perceived to
be quite intense because once a cardholder had been indu~ed to use
the card of a particular issuer, he was likely to remain with that plan
despite the presence of competing programs.11 Thus, issuing banks in
9. The banks in the Midwest Bank Card System were Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Co., Harris Trust and Savings Bank, First National Bank of Chicago,
Central National Bank, and a group of five smaller banks, which, under the direction
of the Pullman Trust and Savings Bank, sponsored a single card. The Pullman group
had originally initiated a card plan that was not part of the system. The Pullman card,
the Illinois Bank Charge, was added to the Midwest Bank Card System shortly after
the initial issuance of other members' cards. See Chicago Tribune, Oct. 16, 1966, § 4,
at 1, col. I. See also Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1966, § 3, at 9, col. 8.
10. See ILL. CoNsr. art. 13, § 8; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16½, § 106 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
11. Customer loyalty is fostered by the fact that the issuer-cardholder relationship
will necessarily continue as long as a balance is outstanding in the card account. While
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Chicago felt it necessary to enter the credit card market before competitors' plans had become firmly established. Moreover, the Bank
of America, which had originally concentrated its card plan in California, had announced its intention to franchise its plan to banks
across the country.12 To ensure that the Chicago market be preserved
for local issuers, the banks sought to launch their plans before the
BankAmericard had attracted significant numbers of merchants and
cardholders.
Among the marketing techniques utilized to reach customers
quickly was the mailing of unsolicited cards to individuals whose
names had been taken from mass-mailing lists.18 While the extent to
which the lists were prescreened is disputed,14 the standards applied
were clearly not as stringent as those used for small personal loans.11i
The screening that was undertaken did not prevent multiple mailings to an individual recipient by a single issuer. Similarly, the desire
to reach persons other than those with an established relationship
with the issuing bank resulted in mailings by several banks to a
single recipient.
The planning undertaken by the issuers was limited by the need
to avoid delays in the initial solicitation of subscribers.16 As a result
of this same pressure, mailings by more than one issuer were undertaken simultaneously.17 Following extensive publicity, cards directed
paying off an existing balance, the holder may make new purchases, which in turn
extend his obligation to the issuer. Also, within the broad categories of card planstravel and entertainment cards, bank cards, and oil company cards-competing plans
possess many of the same operational features, and one plan may offer few advantages
over another. For example, the length of interest-free periods on revolving charges
is often similar. In addition, plans that participate in interchanges such as the
Master Charge system have the same relative number of merchant outlets.
12. See Chicago Tribune, Oct. 16, 1966, § 4, at 1, col. l; at 5, col. 2,
13. Taylor, The Chicago Bank Credit Card Fiasco, BANKERS MAG., Winter 1968, at 49,
50. In many cases where mass-mailing practices were employed, an acceptable credit
card risk was an individual for whom no negative credit information had been
reported. It appears that the usual sources of names were lists of customers of issuing
banks. See generally FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 26-27.
14. See the testimony of Earl Pollock, Midwest Bank Card System, Inc., in Hearings
on H.R. 13244, H.R. 14361, and Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on Postal Operatiom
of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 91st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 91, 102
(1970) [hereinafter 1970 House Hearings]; Taylor, supra note 13, at 50; FED. REsERVE
SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 26-27.
15. In some cases, cards were issued to minors. See note 22 infra and accompanying
text. Many other recipients had no prior dealings with the issuing banks. FED, REsERVE
SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 74.
16. It has been reported that several issuers that had originally intended to
distribute their cards in March 1967 were forced to accelerate their plans when the
Pullman group announced its intention to begin mailing in November 1966. Wall St. J,,
Jan. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 6; at 15, col. 2. See also Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1967, at 28, col. 2,
17. See Chicago Tribune, Oct. 25, 1966, § 3, at 7, col. 4.
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to millions of individuals were placed with the Post Office.18 At the
same time, the postal system was beginning to receive a significant
amount of seasonal mail, and its usual work force had been supplemented by large numbers of temporary workers.19
The competition among the issuers, their marketing techniques,
and the timing of their mailings interacted in a manner that adversely affected the image of both the Chicago banking industry and
bank card plans generally. The distribution suggested a casualness
that had not formerly been a part of the community image of the
issuing banks. Some of the results were humorous. In a three-day
period, one individual received seven cards from a single issuer,20
and another reported receiving eighteen cards from the Chicago
banks.21 Even young children were invited to utilize credit card accounts established on their behalf.22 Other results were far more
serious. There were thefts of large quantities of cards in the postal
system and from recipients' mailboxes. While it appeared that the
misappropriations were the result of an organized effort,23 this fact
was never substantiated. It is clear, however, that significant numbers
of persons were involved in the fraudulent use of the stolen cardsoccasionally with the knowing cooperation of merchants who had
been solicited by the banks to participate in the plan.24
When the scale of the fraudulent activity became 'apparent, the
issuing banks moved quickly to minimize their losses. Merchants
with high loss experiences were dropped from the plans. Other merchants were required to telephone the issuing bank for approval of
every sale.20 Three of the issuing banks eventually recalled all out18. One source estimates that cards were sent to 4 million families. Wall St. J.,
Jan. 17, 1967, at I, col. 6; at 15, col. 2. Continental llinois National Bank and Trust
Co. alone distributed 1.5 million cards. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 25, 1966, § 3, at 7, col. 4.
The cards were mailed first class without registration or other protection.
19. FED. RF.sERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 75.
20. Taylor, supra note 13, at 50. Banks using a number of mailing lists felt that
cross-checking to avoid duplications would not be economically feasible. See FED.
RESERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 74.
21. Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1967, at I, col. 6; at 15, col. 2.
22. The names of minors were apparently secured from their savings and checking
accounts. Instances of multiple receipts resulted when a recipient had several accounts
with the issuing banks. FED. RESERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 74.
23. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 50.
24. Testimony of William J. Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, Post Office Department,
1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 68, 72.
25. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 50. In card plans not experiencing the difficulties
encountered in the first months of the Chicago plans, merchants generally need not
secure issuer approval of sales below a stated amount. The typical floor limit for bank
card plans is fifty dollars. See FED. RESERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, at 12; Clontz, Bank
Credit Cards Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 BANK. L.J. 888, 898-99 (1970).
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standing cards and reissued them only to those persons who were
properly using their cards or who had submitted a written application. Precautions in distribution, such as the use of registered mail,
were initiated.26
Despite these efforts, losses were estimated at six million dollars
for the period from April to June 1967 alone. 27 Bank card plans in
all Federal Reserve Districts except the Chicago district recorded
fraud and credit losses in the first six months of 1967 of 1.04 per cent
of the amount of outstanding account balances. In that same period,
Chicago issuers experienced a 5.73 per cent loss. 28 The quarterly
earnings of some of the issuing banks reflect the significant impact
of these losses on the profitability of the firms. 29
26. See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 75; Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1967, at 28,
col. 2,
27. Taylor, supra note 13, at 51. William J. Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, Post
Office Department, placed the loss at 12 million dollars by August 1967. 1970 House
Hearings, supra note 14, at 241, 244. But see FED. REsERVE SYS. REP,, supra note 3, at
75, concluding that these estimates arc high, since issuers continued to make recoveries,
28. The extent of the fraud and credit losses of the Chicago banks is suggested by
the following data from FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 31. While the Chicago
district includes banks other than those involved in the Midwest Bank Card System,
most of the activity in the district during the period is attributable to issuers in that
system. The table expresses the amount of fraud and credit charge•offs in a six•month
period as a percentage of the amounts outstanding on all cards within the district.
FRAUD
Federal Reserve
District
Boston
New York
Philadelphia
Cleveland
Richmond
Atlanta
St. Louis
Minneapolis
Kansas City
Dallas
San Francisco
All Districts
except Chicago
Chicago
All Districts

AND

CREDIT

LOSSES

Amounts
Charge-offs
Outstanding
Jan. 1 to
Sept. 30, 1967
June 30, 1967
(thousands of dollars)

Loss

Ratios
(per cent)
1.21
.51
1.01
1.41
.72
.63
,Ill

58
151
3495

21,800
64,800
12,300
26,900
28,200
30,600
12,300
100
6,400
8,100
295,300

5250
7233

506,800
126,200

1.0<!
5.73

12483

633,000

1.97

263
332
135
403
204
193
16

.91
1.86
1.18

29. Taylor, supra note 13, at 51, reports 1967 second quarter earnings per share, in
dollars, for the five largest banks in Chicago as follows:
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One result of the initial losses in the Chicago program was that
both the Post Office and card issuers modified their procedures for
distributing unsolicited credit cards.80 While the Chicago experience
was not repeated elsewhere, the resulting publicity underscored the
potential abuse of unsolicited mailings. As other banks and nonbank
issuers increased their reliance on this card distribution technique,
public concern mounted. Although the adverse impact on profits provided the issuers with a strong incentive to curb the abuses of unsolicited mailings, the broader issue of the impact of the credit card
industry upon actual and potential cardholders had now come to
public attention.
C. ·The Federal Credit Card Statute
The mass mailing of unsolicited cards was immediately subjected
to criticism in Congress. The first proposal for regulation was introduced in August 1967.81 The legislative controls initially proposed
were directly responsive to bank efforts to establish and expand
credit card programs as the proposed ban on unsolicited mailings
extended only to these issuers.82 Subsequent bills recognized that
nonbank issuers were utilizing this distribution technique with in-

American
Continental
First National
Harris Trust
Northern

2d Quarter 1966
1.32
.81
1.29

2d Quarter 1967
1.35
.73

1.19

1.08

1.91

1.93

1.11

Of the five, First National, Continental, and Harris had issued credit cards, ,vhile
American and Northern had not. Thus the three issuing banks all posted noticeable
decreases in earnings. The Chairman of the Board at Continental identified "relatively
high" fraud losses as a cause of the decrease in earnings. At Harris, a spokesman
indicated that one reason for the reversal in the upward earnings trend of prior years
was the "increased costs of our charge card plan." Chicago Tribune, July 6, 1967, § 3,
at 7, col. 4. See also Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1967, at 28, col. 2.
30. See statement of William J. Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, Post Office Department, 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 241, 244. An example of the security
measures suggested for protection of unsolicited mailings is reprinted id. at 76.
31. Representative Wright Patman introduced the first bill, H.R. 12646, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967), and chaired the hearings before the House Committee on l3anking and
Currency that considered his proposal and two related measures. See generally 1967
House Hearings, supra note 7.
32. See H.R. 12646, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The number of new entrants into
the bank credit card field increased dramatically in the two-year period preceding the
congressional inquiry into the credit card industry. In 1965, there were sixty-eight
bank card plans in existence, only ten of which had been started later than 1959. But
in 1966-1967, 129 new plans were initiated. See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3,
at 9.
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creasing frequency, and the proposals for regulation were expanded
to include them.3 3
The amendments to the Truth-in-Lending Act that were eventually adopted not only prohibited the distribution of unsolicited
cards but also established a fifty dollar limitation on a cardholder's
liability for unauthorized use of his card. 34 These two controls touch
33. See H.R. 15103, H.R. 13244, H.R. 14346, H.R. 14897, 91st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess,
(1969). See generally 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14. Several of the bills considered
in the 1970 House hearings are summarized in Kennedy, The Plastic Jungle, 31 MoNT.
L. REv. 29, 38-40 (1969). The measure that received the primary attention of the Senate
and served as the basis of the legislation eventually enacted eJ{tended coverage to all
issuers. See 5. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
34. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. V, 84 Stat. 1126. The amendments
added six definitional provisions and new sections 132-34 to the Truth-in-Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 160I-8lt (1970), which now provides in relevant part:
§ 1602. Definitions and rules of construction.
G) The term "adequate notice," as used in section 1643 of this title, means a
printed notice to a cardholder which sets forth the pertinent facts clearly and
conspicuously so that a person against whom it is to operate could reasonably be
expected to have noticed it and understood its meaning. Such notice may be given
to a cardholder by printing the notice on any credit card, or on each periodic
statement of account, issued to the cardholder, or by any other means reasonably
assuring the receipt thereof by the cardholder.
(k) The term "credit card" means any card, plate, coupon book or other credit
device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or services
on credit.
(l) The term "accepted credit card" means any credit card which the cardholder
has requested and received or has signed or has used, or authorized another to use,
for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit.
(m) The term "cardholder" means any person to whom a credit card is issued
or any person who has agreed with the card issuer to pay obligations arising from
the issuance of a credit card to another person.
(n) The term "card issuer" means any person who issues a credit card, or the
agent of such person with respect to such card.
(o) The term "unauthorized use," as used in section 1643 of this title, means a
use of a credit card by a person other than the cardholder who does not have
actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which the card•
holder receives no benefit.
§ 1642. Issuance of credit cards.

No credit card shall be issued except in response to a request or application
therefor. This prohibition does not apply to the issuance of a credit card in
renewal of, or in substitution for, an accepted credit card.
§ 1643. Liability of holder of credit card.
(a} Limits on liability.
A cardholder shall be liable for the unauthorized use of a credit card only if
the card is an accepted credit card, the liability is not in excess of S50, the card
issuer gives adequate notice to the cardholder of the potential liability, the card
issuer has provided the cardholder with a self-addressed, prestamped notification
to be mailed by the cardholder in the event of the loss or theft of the credit card,
and the unauthorized use occurs before the cardholder has notified the card
issuer that an unauthorized use of the credit card has occurred or may occur as
the result of loss, theft, or otherwise. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no cardholdcr
shall be liable for the unauthorized use of any credit card which was issued on
or after the effective date of this section, and, after the expiration of twelve
months following such effective date, no cardholder shall be liable for the unauthorized use of any credit card regardless of the date of its issuance, unless
(1) the conditions of liability specified in the preceding sentence arc met, and
(2) the card issuer has provided a method whereby the user of such card can be
identified as the person authorized to use it. For the purposes of this section, a
cardholder notifies a card issuer by taking such steps as may be reasonably
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upon aspects of credit cards that are not necessarily related. The
provisions share, however, an underlying federal concern about the
practices of an industry that has expanded in a relatively few years
to the point where it directly affects the financial status of the
majority of American families. This Article investigates the bases
of these controls and predicts the likely impact of each upon the
conditions they were designed to alleviate.
II.

THE PROHIBITION OF THE MAILING OF UNSOLICITED CARDS

A.

The Rationale of the Legislative Controls

The legislative history of the amendments to the Truth-in-Lending Act indicates that congressional attention focused on the ban of
unsolicited mailings. Early bills would have prohibited unsolicited
mailings entirely,35 although a subsequently passed House version,
not accepted by the Senate, authorized the Postal Service to adopt
regulations to increase security in the handling of unsolicited cards
in the mail.36 The measure that was eventually enacted originated
from Senate Bill 721.37 In its original form, this bill did not directly
required in the ordinary course of business to provide the card issuer with the
pertinent information whether or not any particular officer, employee, or agent of
the card issuer does in fact receive such information.
(b) Burden of proof.
In any action by a card issuer to enforce liability for the use of a credit card,
the burden of proof is upon the card issuer to show that the use was authorized
or, if the use was unauthorized, then the burden of proof is upon the card issuer
to show that the conditions of liability for the unauthorized use of a credit card,
as set forth in subsection (a) of this section, have been met.
(c) Liability imposed by other laws or by agreement with issuer.
Nothing in this section imposes liability upon a cardholder for the unauthorized use of a credit card in excess of his liability for such use under other
applicable law or under any agreement with the card issuer.
(d) Exclusiveness of liability.
Except as provided in this section, a cardholder incurs no liability from the
unauthorized use of a credit card.
§ 1644. Fraudulent use of credit card.
Whoever, in a transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce, uses any
counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen, or fraudulently obtained credit
card to obtain goods or services, or both, having a retail value aggregating $5,000
or more, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
35. See, e.g., H.R. 12646, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
36. H.R. 16542, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). After perfunctory debate, this measure
was adopted without direct opposition, although there were sixty-four vote pairings.
See 116 CoNG. REc. 30891-92 (1970). See generally H.R. REP. No. 974, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970).
37. S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
A year before S. 721 was considered, the Senate held its initial hearings on the
practices of the credit card industry. Begun in October 1968, this investigation was not
directed toward a specific legislative proposal, but rather was a general inquiry into
the impact of unsolicited mailings. Particular attention was given to a study of bank
credit card systems prepared by the Federal Reserve System. See Hearings on Credit
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regulate unsolicited cards, but rather delegated authority to the
Federal Reserve Board under the Truth-in-Lending Act to formulate
"minimum standards to be followed by all card issuers in checking
the worthiness of prospective cardholders."88 In the hearings on the
bill, however, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
expressed a reluctance to accept additional responsibilities in the
area of consumer protection.39 To avoid the difficulties inherent
in granting rule-making discretion to an unwilling agency, and to
enhance the impact of the legislative control, the Committee amended
the bill to impose an absolute ban on the distribution of unsolicited
credit cards.40
In contrast to the liability limitation provision, which proved to
be noncontroversial, the prohibition of unsolicited mailings drew
opposition from industry representatives and the Federal Reserve
Board.41 While the congressional objectives in prohibiting unsolicCards Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on BanMng
and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (hereinafter 1968 Senate Hearings].
38. S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969).
39. Andrew F. Brimmer, a member of the Board of Governors, reiterated that
group's position that the "assignment to the Board of wide-ranging duties in the
general area of consumer protection would be inconsistent with effective performance
of our primary duties in the field of monetary policy." Hearings on S. 721 Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 18 (1969) (hereinafter 1969 Senate Hearings]. A similar view
was expressed by William McChesney Martin, Jr., another member of the Board. Sec
id. at 7, 8.
In earlier House hearings, representatives of both the Federal Reserve Board and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had questioned the need for legislative
control of unsolicited card distributions in light of the strong economic incentives for
banks to correct their distribution practices in order to minimize losses. Sec 1967 House
Hearings, supra note 7, at 7, 15-16 (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System); id. at 19, 20 (statement of K. A. Randall, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). See also 1968 Senate Hearings, supra
note 37, at 2, 8 (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra. See S. REP. No. 7.39, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970). After the Senate had adopted the amended S. 721, it received
H.R. 16542 from the House. See note 36 supra. The Senate substituted the more
stringent controls of S. 721 in the House measure and requested a conference on the
modification. See 116 CoNc. REc. 31818-19 (1970). :Before this conference was held, the
Senate received from the House an unrelated bill, H.R. 15073, dealing with record•
keeping requirements for federally insured banks. In the course of its consideration of
this bill, the Senate inserted the language of S. 721 and returned it to the House for
conference. After the conference made minor modifications of the criminal liability
provision of the bill, H. R. CoNF. REP. No. 1587, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970), the
measure that originated as S. 721 was approved by the Senate, see 116 CONG. REc. 35943
(1970) (conference report accepted), and by the House, see 116 CONG, REc. 36577
(1970) (conference report accepted).
41. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 118 (statement of James E.
:Brown, Interbank Card Association); id. at 123, 125 (testimony of Edward J. McNeal,
American Retail Federation); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 13, 14 (letter to
Representative Nix from William McChesney Martin, Jr., Board of Governors, Federal
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ited mailings were stated in various forms, the supporters of the
enacted legislation opposed this card distribution technique because,
in their view, the practice gave rise to four undesirable conditions.
They felt that such mailings, by introducing millions of people to
the convenience of credit card purchases stimulated consumer
demand for credit and contributed to the inflationary tendencies
of the nation's economy. Moreover, because the credit investigation
that preceded the mailing of such cards was often superficial, it was
believed that cards came into the hands of many persons incapable
of containing the use of such cards within the limits of their personal
budgets. Third, the mass-mailing technique increased the likelihood
of criminal diversion of cards, which in tum increased the burden on
law enforcement agencies. Finally, because the cards were sent to
persons who had not requested them, the unsolicited distribution
of cards was regarded as an invasion of privacy.42

I.

The Significance of Unsolicited Credit Cards
in an Inflationary Economy

The inflationary impact of credit cards allegedly manifested itself
in several forms. The sponsors of the legislation often argued that
credit cards provided a readily available form of credit that induced
consumers to increase spending.43 The resulting demand for goods
and services put pressure on an economy that, at the time of the
emergence of bank-sponsored plans, was expanding at- a potentially
inflationary rate.44 There were in fact significant increases in the
amount of charges outstanding on all types of credit cards. In the
two-year period from 1967 through 1969, outstanding card credit increased by more than one third, or nearly four billion dollars.45 A
Reserve System); id. at 91, 92 (testimony of Earl Pollock, Midwest Bank Card System,
Inc.); id. at 162, 163 (testimony of John P. LaWare, Bank Card Committee, American
Bankers Association).
42. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 1-2 (statement of Senator
Proxmire); id. at 8, 10 (statement of Representative Hanley); 1970 House Hearings,
supra note 14, at 3 (statement of Representative Nix); 116 CONG. REc. 11828-30 (1970)
(statement of Senator Proxmire); id. at 11831 (statement of Senator McIntyre); id. at
30878-79 (statement of Representative Olsen).
43. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 8, 9 (statement of Representa•
tive Hanley); id. at 131, 132 (statement of Jerome R. Gulan, National Federation of
Independent Businesses, Inc.); 116 CoNG. R.Ec. 11830 (1970) (statement of Senator
Proxmire).
44. The Federal Reserve Board, which was not resisting the proliferation of credit
cards in the consumer credit sector, had undertaken efforts, such as raising the discount
rate, to "soften" the demand for other forms of credit. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
1968, at 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1968, § 3, at 1, col. 7.
45. The Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Consumer Credit and
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significant portion of this increase is attributable to the expansion
of bank credit card plans. But, despite the vast amount of credit resulting from credit card use,46 the relative importance of the contribution of unsolicited cards to inflationary trends can be questioned.
While the amount of card credit was undergoing significant increases,
total consumer debt was increasing by greater amounts, indicating
that expansion of consumer demand for credit was not a phenomenon attributable solely to credit cards.47 Moreover, the proportion
of total consumer debt represented by card credit remained relatively
small, accounting for 11.26 per cent of total debt at the end of 1967
and 12.49 per cent two years later.48 Perhaps the most apparent defect
Finances Section, has compiled figures for revolving credit plans, broken down by the
various types of issuers, as follows:
REvOLVING CREDIT PLANS
(Amounts Outstanding in Billions of Dollars)
Type of Credit
Bank Credit Cards
(excluding check-credit plans)
Oil Companies
(consumer portion only)
Department Store Revolving Credit
Retail Charge Accounts
Travel &: Entertainment Cards
(consumer portion only)
All Others
Total

Dec. 31,
1967

Dec. 31,
1968

Dec. 31,
1969

Dec. 31,
1970

0.8

1.3

2.6

3.7

1.0
3.5
5.9

1.2
3.7
6.5

1.5
4.2
6.7

1.8
4.6
6.9

0.1
0.2

0.1
0.2

0.1
0.2

0.1
0.2

11.5

13.0

15.3

17.3

\

Reported by Andrew F. Brimmer, Bank Credit Cards: The Record of Innovation and
Growth (paper presented at the Annual Seminar of the Puerto Rican Bankers Assn.,
March 26, 1971) [hereinafter Brimmer Paper], on file with the Michigan Law Review.
See also 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 31 (submission of Andrew F. Brimmer,
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System); S. REP. No. 739, supra note 40, at 2,
46. It is inaccurate to refer to the entire amount outstanding as "credit"; the
portion of this amount that is paid off within one month more resembles a cash
transaction. Hence, comparisons of this total amount to traditional forms of long-term
consumer credit, such as automobile loans or other commercial paper, arc somewhat
misleading. See Brandel &: Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69
MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1039, 1059-61 (1971).
47. A comparison of total consumer credit and credit card credit in billions of
dollars for the years 1967-1970 is presented below:

End of Period
Total Consumer Credit
Credit Card Credit
1967
102.132
11.5
1968
113.191
13.0
1969
122.469
15.3
1970
126.802
17.3
Compare 57 FED. RF.s. BULL. A56 Only 1971), with note 45 supra. The growth of con•
sumer debt during the past decade was phenomenal, rising from 56 billion dollars in
1960 to more than twice that in 1970. 57 FED. RF.s. BULL., supra, at A56.
48. 57 FED. RF.s. BULL., supra note 47, at A56. Those advocating controls c;o\\ld point
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in the inflationary argument was the absence of any attempt to identify the relative impact of unsolicited cards. Even if card credit had
inflationary ramifications, it was never proved that control of unsolicited cards alone would have any appreciable impact on the
growth of card usage.
The analysis of the inflationary impact of cards also failed to
evaluate the extent to which increases in card credit merely represented substitutions for more traditional forms of credit. A portion
of the increase in credit card balances probably represents a movement away from consumer credit in the form of short-term personal
loans and individual charge accounts. 49 In many other instances,
credit cards were used as a substitute for cash.5° Concerned about
the risk of carrying large amounts of cash, individuals-particularly
those who traveled extensively-logically turned to credit cards. To
the extent that charge balances are paid immediately upon billing,
credit card usage does not necessarily increase either the extent of
consumer buying or the amount of outstanding consumer credit.
Because the merchant-cardholder agreement generally provided
that merchants participating in independent plans would be reimbursed by issuers in an amount less than the total amount of the
sale,61 Congress was also concerned that the merchant would pass
this discount on to the consumer in the form of higher prices, a
condition that added to existing inflationary trends. 52 The hearings
include no serious attempt to provide an empirical basis for the
to a significant growth in bank cards. On the implicit assumption that most of these
were unsolicited, they argued that the growth of bank card usage evidenced inflationary
pressures. The amount of credit outstanding on bank credit cards increased from 0.8
billion dollars in 1967 to 2.6 billion dollars in 1969. See note 45 supra. However, compared to a total consumer debt of 102 billion dollars in 1967 and 122.5 billion dollars in
1969, this growth did not appear to have had a substantial impact on the growth
of consumer credit. See note 47 supra.
49. The confusion that existed with respect to the significance of credit card
growth is illustrated by Senator Proxmire's analysis that "when you have $15 billion
more of demand in our economy, ... it undoubtedly does have a significant effect on
inflation, •••" 116 CONG. R.Ec. 11830 (1970). This statement presumes that all card
credit was "new" credit-that is, credit that would not otherwise have been demanded.
50. See Brandel & Leonard, supra note 46, at 1039, 1059-61. The characterization of a
credit card purchase as either a "cash" transaction or a "credit" transaction has
important implications for the policy question whether the cardholder should be able
to assert against the issuer defenses arising out of his transactions with a merchant.
See generally id.; Note, Preserving Consumer Defenses in Credit Card Transactions, 81
YALE L.J. 287 (1971).
51. A sample merchant-issuer agreement is set out in Davenport, supra note 1, at
248-51.
52. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 11830 (1970) (statement of Senator McIntyre); 1969
Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 75, 79 (statement of Professor Willier, National
Consumer Law Center, Boston College).
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validity of that analysis. Indeed, the significance of the discount was
overstated. While some supporters of the legislation estimated the
discount to be as high as seven per cent of the purchase price,li3 the
figure more typically cited was five per cent.54 In fact, in most credit
card transactions the discount was less than this. For example, while
banks usually sought to secure a three per cent discount from retailers other than petroleum dealers and service organizations,56 competition among issuing banks sometimes drove the discount levels
dmvn as low as one per cent.li6 Moreover, the payment of the discount would not necessarily cause the merchant to raise his prices.
In exchange for the discount, the issuer would assume the risk of
nonpayment and the cost of maintaining the necessary accounting
and collection systems; hence, the merchant was relieved of the costs
associated with these activities. Merchants might also increase their
sales as a result of participation in the plan, thereby offsetting any
increase in costs caused by the discount. 67
It is not suggested that the inflationary implications of credit
card usage can be disproved by this limited analysis. What is sug•
gested, however, is that the congressional investigation of the impact
of credit cards on inflation was inadequate. The presence of a significant inflationary trend could not be attributed to credit cards,
much less to unsolicited cards. This perceived danger resulting from
unsolicited credit cards offers no persuasive justification for the
statutory prohibition.

2.

The Impact on Personal Financial Integrity

Another frequently stated concern of the sponsors of the credit
card legislation was the impact that the mass distribution of cards
had upon the ability of certain recipients to avoid assuming excessive credit responsibilities.58 It was feared that credit cards were
being sent to persons who were incapable of appreciating the obliga53. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 4, 6 (testimony of Representative
Patman).
54. 116 CONG. R.Ec. 11830 (1970) (statement of Senator Proxmire).
55. See Wall St. J., May 24, 1966, at 32, col. 2.
56. See Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1967, at I, col. 6; at 15, col. 2, reprinted in 1969
Senate Hearings, supra note • , at 233, 235; Taylor, supra note 13, at 52,
57. See Johnston, supra ~,ote 5, at 257; Brandel &: Leonard, supra note 46, at
1040. If the issuers are SU(Cessful in enlisting a significant number of competing
merchants, the competitive aC:vantage would be cancelled, undercutting the argument
that the discount would be absorbed.
58. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 22 (statement of Representative
Patten); 116 CONG. R.Ec. 11828 (1970) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
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tion that attended their use. 59 The perceived consequence was disintegration of personal financial stability and a concomitant increase
in personal bankruptcies. Although the concern surfaced in both the
House and Senate, it was most directly reflected by the legislation
proposed in the latter. The House proposals generally regulated only
the manner in which unsolicited cards were mailed and, thus, did
nothing to ensure that mailings were not made to unqualified persons.60 On the other hand, the original Senate version of S. 721
indicated a paramount concern for the impact of the cards on the
recipients' credit standing. The rule-making authority proposed for
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System directed the
Board to prescribe standards that would "protect consumers against
over-extending themselves with credit obtained through the use of
unsolicited credit cards ...." 61 This provision was subsequently replaced by the absolute prohibition on unsolicited mailings, but the
concern that prompted the original version continued to be expressed.62
In attempting to quantify the adverse impact of uncontrolled
extensions of credit, the sponsors relied heavily on testimony concerning the increasing role of credit cards in personal bankruptcy
proceedings.63 In 1967, the first year Congress investigated unsolicited cards, the number of nonbusiness bankruptcies surpassed
190,000, culminating several years of significant increases.64 Answering inquiries from the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts about the significance of credit cards in recent bankruptcy
cases, several bankruptcy referees indicated that debts incurred
through the use of credit cards were appearing with unprecedented
59. For example, a janitor earning $55 per week ran up debts totalling more than
$3000, 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 36; a bankrupt with assets of $20 ran up
debts of $11,178 on a worldwide tour, id. at 46; and an alcoholic ran up a liquor
bill of $500 in a short period of time, 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 34.
60: See H.R. 12646, H.R. 13600, H.R. 13796, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R.
15103, H.R. 13244, H.R. 14346, H.R. 14897, 91st Cong., 1st&: 2d Sess. (1969). A measure
eventually passed by the House, but not accepted in the Senate, merely directed the
Postal Service to adopt regulations to control the manner in which unsolicited cards
were mailed. See H.R. 16542, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also notes 35-36 supra and
accompanying text.
61. S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(l) (1969).
62. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 11841 (1970) (remarks of Senator Percy, who supported
a more flexible standard of controlling the overextension of the consumer's credit).
63. See statements of Royal E. Jackson, Chief of the Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, in 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 30-61; 1969
Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 43-61; 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 132-62.
64. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 152 (statement of Royal E. Jackson,
Chief of the Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
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frequency. 65 One congressman, noting that the number of nonbusiness bankruptcies had more than doubled in two years, concluded that "most, if indeed not all, of the increase . . . can be
attributed to the indiscriminate and uncontrolled use of credit
cards." 66
A closer examination suggests that this conclusion was unsupported by the data presented by the referees. In the two years following commencement of the congressional inquiry into the economic
impact of credit cards, the number of nonbusiness bankruptcies declined.67 Since credit card use was expanding in this period, 08 the
impact of credit cards on personal bankruptcies appears minimal.
The increase in the number of bankruptcy filings prior to 1967 is
more appropriately explained by its relationship to the significant
growth of total consumer credit during that period.09 In addition,
the responses of the bankruptcy referees were not overwhelmingly
convincing. Most responses were not based on a systematic survey of
pending cases, while in other responses, the data supplied did not
suggest that credit cards were of noticeable importance.7° Furthermore, credit card debts owed to issuers were generally a relatively
small proportion of the bankrupt's total indebtedness.71 Significantly,
neither the responses of bankruptcy referees nor the testimony during the hearings attempted to determine the extent to which credit
card debts were substitutions for other forms of borrowing by bankrupts. While the data presented do suggest that other forms of credit
65. In the Eastern District of Tennessee, where the most complete statistics were
gathered, debts on bank cards were listed in 17 per cent of the wage-earner cases
filed. The average indebtedness on these cards was $542, while the average total indebtedness of the bankrupts was $4200. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 48.
66. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 237, 238 (testimony of Representative
Charles Wilson).
67. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 152. Royal E. Jackson, Chief of the
Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, submitted the following
information on bankruptcy filings by class:

Fiscal Year
1966
1967
1968
1969

Nonbusiness Bankruptcies
175,924
191,729
181,266
169,500

Total Bankruptcies
192,35•!
208,329
197,811
184,930

68, See note 45 supra, which illustrates the increase in credit card balances. See also
note 48 supra.
69. See generally Countryman, Proposed New Amendments for Chapter XIII, 22
Bus. LAW. 1151 (1967).
70. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 43-44 (letter from the Referee in
Bankruptcy, Western District of Washington); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at
143-44 (letter from the Referee in Bankruptcy, Southern District of Ohio),
71. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 41 (letter from the Referee in
Bankruptcy, District of Minnesota); id. at 44-45 (letter from the Referee in Bankruptcy,
Eastern District of Wisconsin).
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might not have been available for some purchases made with credit
cards, many items purchased on cards could have been financed by
other means. On the basis of the evidence presented to Congress,
it can only be said that the incidence of credit card debts revealed in
bankruptcy proceedings increased in the few years preceding the
initiation of the congressional inquiry. But because no attempt was
made to quantify and analyze that increase, and since the years sampled reflected only the early history of unsolicited mailings by banks,
the adverse impact perceived by some provides an inadequate basis
for generalization about subsequent experience. The testimony presented does not support the conclusion that a prohibition of unsolicited mailings would have an appreciable impact on the frequency of
nonbusiness bankruptcies.
An additional factor that seemed to support the concern for
the impact of credit cards upon personal financial integrity was the
higher loss ratio experienced by banks on card credit than on other
forms of consumer lending.72 The evidence available during the congressional investigation was not unequivocal, for the delinquency
rates under established card plans compared favorably with the
experience of banks on other types of loans.73 But findings of the
72. See S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
73. While limitations in available data preclude convincing generalization, some
banks experienced relatively low delinquency rates. The delinquency experience of
banks in the Federal Reserve Districts of New York and San Francisco in 1967 compare
favorably with other types of loans. Banks in these districts experienced delinquencies
of approximately 1.57 per cent of the dollar value of their customers' credit card
transactions. FED. REsERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, at 32. By comparison, data reflecting
the experience of all Federal Reserve banks indicate that 1.45 per cent of all regular
installment loans were delinquent. Home appliance loans, a type of credit closely
related to card credit, Johnston, supra note 5, at 256, were delinquent at the rate of
2.19 per cent. Automobile and personal loans, the two other types of loans represented
in the composite figure, were delinquent at the rates of 1.24 and 1.48 per cent,
respectively. FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 32. Incomplete statistics from
1966 suggested a similarly favorable comparison. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note
7, at 55 (testimony of Andrew F. Brimmer, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve
System).
The New York and San Francisco districts cover bank card plans that were
relatively mature when the statistics were compiled. Available data indicate that losses
experienced in a card plan decrease as the age of the plan increases.
BANK CR.EDIT

CARD Loss RATIOS BY LENGTH OF IssUER OPERATIONS

Years in Operation
11 or more

9-10
7-8
5-6
3-4
0-2
Average Loss

Loss Ratio (per cent)
1.03
1.17
0.19
1.25
1.43

3.25
I.97

This table indicates loss ratios rather than the delinquency rates discussed above. Data
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Federal Reserve System made available after the close of legislative
hearings do confirm that credit card losses are appreciably higher
than those experienced with other forms of loans.74 Since many
bank plans were initiated by unsolicited mailings, this form of card
distribution seemed to be related to the higher default rate. Available data, however, does not confirm this relationship. Statistics on
loss experiences in bank plans do not distinguish between solicited
and unsolicited accounts. Furthermore, the difference in default
rates between card credit and other forms of lending is more directly
related to the nature of the credit than to the manner of its issuance.
With other forms of credit, the lender can make an evaluation of the
debtor's credit standing before the credit is used. The debtor's use
of card credit, however, is not directly supervised on a transactional
basis. Card credit, while typically subject to a credit limit, continues
to be available despite changes in the borrower's financial position.
The loss experience of card issuers has been significantly affected
by changes in general economic conditions. The increased losses that
issuers experienced in 1969 and 1970 are explained, in part, by the
recession that was developing in that period. This condition produced dramatic increases in the delinquency rates suffered by issuers,
an effect not limited to firms that relied heavily on unsolicited mailings.75 While defaults in other types of consumer loans also are
affected by deteriorating economic conditions, the impact on card
credit is likely to be more pronounced because of the less direct
supervision of such lending. Moreover, because the debtor often has
greater control over the rate of his repayment of credit card account
balances, other types of loans, particularly fixed-sum installment
on the loss experience of bank credit cards does not distinguish between fraud losses
and credit losses. Since losses due to fraud may be incurred through misuse by a person
other than the cardholder, the stated loss experience is not a precise indicator of the
extent to which individuals fail to meet their credit card obligations. Loss ratios and
delinquency rates logically should, however, bear a closely proportional relationship,
The delinquency rates of plans in some districts other than New York and San
Francisco were unusually high. Banks in the Chicago area, for example, experienced a
delinquency rate of 3.69 per cent. Rates in these areas are probably not representative
of the likely long-term experience of issuing banks. See FED. R.EsERVE SYS. REP., supra
note 3, Table SA at 32.
74. As a percentage of year-end outstanding credit advances, charge-offs on bank
credit cards among all members of the Federal Reserve System were 2.38 per cent in
1969. The banks' loss experience worsened in 1970, as charge-offs amounted to 3.39 per
cent. Losses on other types of consumer loans were significantly less. In 1969, for
example, losses on personal loans were approximately 0.8 per cent of the outstanding
advances. See Brimmer Paper, supra note 45, at 6-7. See also 1967 House Hearings,
supra note 7, at 12. The higher charge-offs for bank credit cards may be due in part
to the inclusion of fraud losses in the totals. See note 73 supra.
75. The number of delinquencies in the accounts of the Diners' Club, which issues
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obligations, are likely to be given priority as resources available to a
debtor for repayment become strained.
The legislative inquiry into the impact of credit cards gave particular attention to the numerous reports of personal financial difficulties resulting from credit card use. A partial explanation for many
of these experiences is found in the techniques used to develop
credit card plans, particularly those initiated by banks. During the
years immediately following initiation of a card plan, a bank often
experiences a large loss rate; 76 as the plan matures, losses decrease.
Many of the publicized credit card abuses occurred during the
period immediately following initiation of a plan and often involved
cards that were sent following only limited credit investigations.
While the rigor of an issuer's credit standards was increased as loss
experiences became known, initially high personal default rates may
be inherent in the system used for selecting participants in card plans.
Issuers of card credit observe lower credit standards in an effort to
achieve the volume of cardholders necessary to sustain a profitable
program.77 Rather than relying solely on preissuance credit evaluations, in many cases the issuer uses a cardholder's actual payment
performance to determine his suitability as a credit risk.78 Through
adequate control of the initial credit limit for cardholders with
questionable credit ratings, the issuer can extend his plan to persons
who might not meet more traditional credit standards, while nevertheless ensuring that losses will not exceed reasonable limits.
This market-selection technique contributed to the congressional
dissatisfaction with credit card plans, particularly those initiated by
banks in the mid-1960's. The legislative history suggests that many
congressmen felt that it was improper for issuers to induce an individual to test his capacity to handle credit. It is doubtful, however,
that the legislation ultimately adopted will substantially deter this
technique.79 In those situations where the person requesting a card
has completed an application, an issuer may continue to employ
cards only in response to applications, doubled in the period from June 1969 to December 1970. See Ross, The Credit Card's Painful Coming-of-Age, FORTUNE, Oct. 1971, at
108, 110. The charge-offs in bank credit cards mirrored this experience. See note 74
supra.
76. See note 73 supra.
77. See Brandel &: Leonard, supra note 46, at 1036-37.
78. Cf. 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 19 (testimony of Andrew F. Brimmer,
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
79. Insofar as the prohibition of mailing unsolicited cards increases the cost of initiating new credit card plans, however, it will inhibit their creation altogether. See
notes 107-08 infra and accompanying text.
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limited preissuance credit-screening and choose instead to rely heavily on the payment performance of the cardholder. The prohibition
on unsolicited mailings, unlike the original version of S. 721 which
would have ordered the Federal Reserve Board to establish minimum credit standards, leaves the matter of credit evaluation to the
issuer's discretion. The factor that operates to limit the level of risk
an issuer will find acceptable-the threat of limited profitabilityis unaffected by the legislative prohibition of unsolicited mailings.

3. Criminal Activity and Unsolicited Cards
The generalized use of credit cards was accompanied by an increase in criminal activity involving credit cards. Easily obtained by
illicit means, credit cards were often accepted without corroborating
identification by merchants who were assured of reimbursement by
the issuer. A study undertaken by the Federal Reserve System indicated that the huge losses suffered by issuers in Chicago were primarily the result of fraudulent misuse by unintended recipients
rather than overextension of credit to intended recipients. 80 The
Post Office reported a dramatic increase in the number of prosecutions arising from credit card thefts,81 and several well-publicized instances of criminal misuse of credit cards were circulated while congressional hearings were being conducted. 82 This evidence prompted
proponents of the federal legislation to suggest that federal controls
were necessary in order to thwart criminal activity in credit cards.88
A major deficiency in this analysis was the failure of Congress to
recognize that card issuers had a significant financial incentive to
develop distribution procedures that would minimize the incidence
of card misuse. The Chicago experience and losses sustained by banks
elsewhere suggest a relationship between mass mailings and theft; 84
80. See Fm. Rl!sERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 75. Statements of officials of the Chi•
cago banks, although understandably guarded, also indicated the importance of fraud
losses in the initially adverse experience of the Chicago issuers. See Chicago Tribune,
July 6, 1967, § 3, at 7, col. 4.
81. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 70. William J. Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, Post Office Department, testified that mail fraud investigations involving credit
cards increased from 15 in 1964, to 360 in 1968, and to 762 in 1969,
82. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 235, reprintitig Wall St. J.,
July 30, 1969, at 7, col. 4; id. at 236, reprinting Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1967, § F,
at I, col. 4.
83. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 8, 12 (statement of Representative Hanley); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of Representative Nix); 116
CONG. R.Ec. 11839 (1970) (statement of Senator Proxmire); id. at 30878-79 (statement of
Representative Olsen).
84. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 83-90 (testimony of Seymour Rotker,
Executive Assistant to the District Attorney, Bronx, New York).
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but because issuers bore the financial loss of misappropriation, it
could be expected that they would develop more sound distribution
techniques. Indeed, as additional security measures were devised to
protect card distributions, losses in mailing were reduced to an insignificant level.85 Yet, Congress made no attempt to determine the
extent to which susceptibility to theft experienced in Chicago and
elsewhere had been corrected by the issuers themselves.
Reliance on the criminal-misuse rationale is also misplaced because Congress failed to realize that misuse would not be curbed by
a legislative control that affected only unsolicited cards. The primary
attraction of the credit card as a vehicle for criminal activity is the
relative ease with which fraudulent charges can be made. Hence, a
limitation on the conditions by which cards are distributed is likely
to produce only an alteration in the techniques used to acquire
cards.86 Most criminal use of such cards involves techniques that can
be applied whether a credit card was unsolicited or issued pursuant
to a request. Misappropriation techniques include diversion by dishonest employees of credit card issuers, thefts during burglaries or
personal assaults, retention by dishonest merchants during sales
transactions, and misdirection of cards by false applications or requests for renewals 87-none of which depends upon an initial unsolicited issuance. A ban of unsolicited cards reduces the opportunity
for criminal misuse insofar as it may limit the aggregate number
of credit cards in circulation, but there is no indication that Congress employed the ban of unsolicited mailings in order to limit the
growth of the credit card industry. Until the underlying condition
of ready acceptability is remedied, credit card crimes are not likely
to be deterred.
4.

Privacy Intrusions

Although the prohibition of unsolicited mailings is likely to have
little impact in confronting the problems of inflation, credit misuse,
or credit card crimes, the ban does have the effect of preventing
further invasions of the privacy of card recipients. Yet, the prohibition is a limited, rather than comprehensive, control of privacy
85. According to one informal survey, three New York banks that mailed 2 million cards in one week lost only 250 cards. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at
232, 235 (statement of New York State Senator John Dunne).
86. Other measures such as more stringent identification procedures would make the
card less readily usable by unauthorized holders, and hence would offer a more likely
solution to the problem. See note 141 infra.
87. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 242-43 (statement by William Lottes,
Chief Postal Inspector, Post Office Department); Wall. St. J., Nov. 18, 1970, at I, col. 6.
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intrusions. Despite the ban of the mailing of unsolicited cards,
individuals continue to be subjected to mailings and solicitations
in other forms. Circulars and application forms may still be mailed
without limitation. 88 An issuer also may resort to telephone solicitations to induce the "request" required by the statute, 89 and in
many situations the telephone request may cause the recipient particular inconvenience. Such a solicitation commands the immediate
attention of the person called and, unlike a mailing, may divert his
concentration from more highly valued activities. Perhaps more significantly, because the legislative action forecloses one effective avenue of solicitation, issuers will increasingly resort to these other
forms. Hence, privacy intrusions from credit card issuers not only
will continue, but also are likely to be attempted with increased
frequency.
In this perspective, the condition confronted by the new legislation does not address all the potential forms of privacy invasions by
issuers, but only the specific intrusion unique to mailings of unsolicited cards: such cards force recipients into commercial associations that they might not otherwise choose. Admittedly, as a result
of general commercial practices, individuals are frequently thrust
into a variety of involuntary associations, such as those that result
from the distribution of subscription cards prestamped with the
recipient's name or the use of one's name in promotional material
sent to third parties. 00 But the relationship that flows from unsolicited credit cards has tw-o distinctive features: the recipient must take
significant affirmative action to terminate the association, and the
consequences of not terminating it are perceived to be great.
The hearings held on the statute reveal that the mailing of unsolicited cards was a matter of significant public concern. The reports
are replete with letters from individuals expressing alarm because
they had been extended credit.91 This response, from a public con88. While the legislation is intended to make it more difficult for issuers to get cards
into the hands of recipients, the difficulty involved in securing a cardholder's commit•
ment may be minimal. An issuer might offer to send a card if the preselected recipient
indicates his assent on a business reply card. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 87,
at 27 (statement of Senator Proxmire).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 84 supra. Techniques of oral solicitation
have already been refined. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 179•91 (statement
of Irvin Penner, President, The Gracious Lady Service, Inc., urging an exemption for
oral solicitations).
90. See A. MILLER, THE AssAULT ON PRIVACY 80-82 (1971).
91. See, e.g., 1967 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 57 (letter to Betty Furness, Spe•
cial Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs); id. at 95•107 (letters to Representative Patman); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 88-39 (letters to Representative
Bingham).
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tinually subjected to a barrage of unwanted mail, may appear surprising. The ferocity of the responses suggests, however, that the card
mailings affected a particularly sensitive concern: most individuals
regard their :financial affairs as highly personal matters and are
offended when an account is created for them without their consent
-perhaps with an institution with which they have had no previous
contact.
If that association could be terminated easily, the offensiveness
of the intrusion would be minimal. Recipients thought, however,
that the particular relationship created by a credit card could be
ended only by considerable initiative on their part, and the perceived
significance of a failure to do so was quite important. There was
particular concern that the intended recipient might be liable for
purchases made by someone who had intercepted the card from the
mails. Despite considerable evidence that few issuers attempted to
hold recipients liable for unauthorized uses occurring before an unsolicited card came within their control, 92 many persons nevertheless
believed that some liability might result. 93 Even if the card arrived
safely, discarding it would not necessarily produce the desired result;
the card might be retrieved by another person and used to make
charges against the holder's account. 94 Some recipients regarded destruction of the card as a difficult task. 95 Whether the card was intercepted from the mails or arrived safely, there remained the risk that
accounting errors would result in charges against the account. 96 In
any case, the cardholder would have to endure the inconvenience
both of informing the issuer of the improper charges and presenting
a credible case that the debts should not be attributed to him.
While statistics suggest that only a small portion of intended recipients took affirmative action to contact the card issuers,97 they do
92. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 103, 106 (statement of Thomas Bailey,
American Bankers Association); id. at 14, 18-19 (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer, Board
of Governors, Federal Reserve System); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 91, 92
(statement by Earl Pollock, Midwest Bank Card System, Inc.). See also FED. REsERVE
Svs. REP., supra note 3, at 75.
93. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 8, 11 (statement of Representative Hanley); id. at 63, 64 (statement of Robert Meade, Director, Legislative Affairs,
President's Committee on Consumer Interests).
94. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 96-97 (letter to Representative Patman
evincing concern over disposing of a credit card).
95. 116 CONG. REc. 11829 (1970) (statement of Senator Proxmire).
96. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 32, 35 (statement of Paul Rand
Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).
97. Several banks reported that less than one per cent of the mass-mailed cards
were returned. 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 24 (statement of Thomas Bailey,
American Bankers Association). Statistics compiled by Shell Oil Company show a return
rate of I.I per cent. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 228.
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not refute the presence of considerable concern and confusion in
recipients' minds. Only a few individuals expended the additional
effort to contact their legislative representatives, but the number
was sufficiently large to prompt members of Congress to generalize
the concern.98 Moreover, there was relatively little political risk in a
stand against credit cards since the issue was not likely to generate
general public opposition. Most people would not be angered if the
flow of unsolicited cards were interrupted, and those who desired
the opportunity to receive a credit card could do so by a simple
request to issuers who were anxious to expand their programs.
Presented with an opportunity to register support for the growing
consumer protection movement without inviting public controversy,
the legislators were secure in approving the measure.

5.

The Relative Importance of the Stated Legislative Objectives

Analysis of the legislative deliberations suggests that the association between the first three conditions-inflationary pressures, unreasonable consumer debt, increased crime-and unsolicited credit
cards was not established to a degree justifying congressional action.
The fourth condition-privacy intrusions-is not a feature unique to
unsolicited credit cards, but can be understood only in terms of the
forced associations resulting from unsolicited mailings and the sensitivity of consumers to interference with their personal financial
affairs.
The singular prominence of the concern for the impact of forced
associations is highlighted by the realization that the other legislative objectives could have been furthered by measures less drastic
than the mailing prohibition. Indeed, the desired effects would have
been fostered by a statute that simply imposed the costs of card misuse solely on the issuer. This is particularly true with respect to the
concern for increased crime and personal bankruptcies. Forcing issuers to bear the cost of criminal misuse-as other provisions of the
statute require99-assures that precautions will be taken to curtail
losses attributable to these causes.100 Similarly, discharge of consumer
debts through the bankruptcy process will lead issuers to tighten
their lending practices and raise their credit standards. In either case,
the additional measure of prohibiting unsolicited mailings would
98. See, e.g., 1967 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 95-107 (letters to Representative
Patman).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra.
100. See Note, Credit Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 77 YALE L.J. 1418, 1424-26
(1968).
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seem inefficient since it affects only a limited number of credit card
arrangements.101 But, while the mailing prohibition is an ineffective
tool for securing these other goals, it is highly effective in protecting
recipients from the intrusion of an undesired financial involvement.
Therefore, the form of control enacted seems most responsive to
the privacy objective, for, unlike the other forms of regulation considered by Congress, it produces an abrupt termination of the condition that produced dissatisfaction. Enactment of the mailing prohibition is justified only if protection of association is recognized
as its primary objective.

B.

The Operational Impact of the Mailing Prohibition

I.

The Impact on Competition

The prohibition of the mailing of unsolicited cards is likely to
provide individuals with the desired protection from involuntary
financial associations, but a question remains whether the prohibition produces negative consequences that outweigh the policies justifying enactment. A potential consequence of particular importance
is the extent to which the ban either deters new entrants in the
credit card field or limits the growth of existing small issuers. While
congressional concern with the possible anticompetitive consequence
of the statute was given expression in early versions of S. 721,102 the
final enactment contains no provision responsive to it. This omission
suggests the difficulty of securing effective distribution controls while
at the same time allowing issuers the relatively free access to markets
necessary to support competitive card plans.
An issuer undertaking a card program on a large scale faces significant start-up costs, particularly if its card program is not part of a
merchandising operation.103 These costs may result in an operating
101. Control of inflation is not as readily achieved by alternative measures. Its
"costs" cannot be assessed directly to issuers. Legislative measures, however, could impose an obligation on the issuer to deter inflationary expansion of card credit that
would be more likely to achieve the desired result than the restriction adopted. The
issuer might, for example, be assigued an aggregate credit limit to be observed in its
card program. This could be based on the extent of substituted credit used in the plan
or an amount deemed within the limits of reasonable consumer credit growth.
102. The original version of S. 721 provided that the mailing prohibition would take
effect six months after the bill's enactment. S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969). In
addition, the Committee versions required that unsolicited cards that were previously
sent could be renewed only upon request. S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1969).
Both of these provisions were intended to limit the competitive advantage given to
banks with established plans. See 116 CONG. REc. 11832-34 (1970) (debate on Senator
Williams' amendment to relax the renewal requirements).
103. A merchandiser is already carrying on sales transactions into which his card
may be introduced.

1502

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1475

loss during early years.104 In addition, considerable expense is
necessary to maintain an efficient accounting system. Profitability
of a card plan is by no means assured, as is evidenced by the abandonment of a number of the earliest bank card plans.105
Because of the sizable investment and operating costs required,
profitability depends upon the participation of a large number of
subscribers with active accounts. 106 In order to generate the necessary
volume, most nonmerchandising issuers resorted to the mass distribution of unsolicited cards. 107 Issuers realized that many persons who
would be requested to join a plan would not be prepared to do so at
the time the request was made. Unsolicited cards were distributed
because a solicitation that merely invited the recipient to submit an
application was likely to be discarded and forgotten before the desire to use a credit card arose. If, on the other hand, the card itself
were placed in his hands, a recipient might retain the card and use
it when a need for credit occurred. Moreover, receipt of the card
made it unnecessary for a person to take the affirmative step of preparing and submitting a formal application form. The incomplete
statistics that are available suggest that issuers are correct in believing that the mailing of unsolicited cards attracts more users than
distribution of application forms and promotional material.1°8 It
104. The Bank of America card plan, for example, did not operate at a profitable
level during its first four years, despite the fact that it developed in a market with
fewer competitors than presently exists in most cities. Wall St. J., May 24, 1966, at 32,
cols. 2-3. A recent survey revealed that start-up costs averaged two per cent of total
bank operating expenses, followed by current e.xpenses matching current revenues after
one and one-half to two and one-half years, and a complete recovery of start-up costs
within three to four years. See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 27-28. Programs
begun during more recent periods have had similar experiences. 1969 Senate Hearings,
supra note 39, at ll8, 121 (statement of James Brown, Interbank Card Association).
105. See FED. RE.sERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, at 30. Some have questioned whether
the banking industry's original optimism about the profitability of bank card plans was
justified. Because of relatively high credit and fraud losses, as well as unanticipated
operating costs, one industry representative has observed that "many banks with credit
card plans are beginning to adopt the view that the cards do not represent a good profit
opportunity." American Banker, April 7, 1971, at 24, col. 1 (statement of John R.
Bunting, President, First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co.).
106. See Davenport, supra note I, at 225 n.32; FED. RE.sERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3,
at 25-27. It is difficult to interest merchants in the plan without a large backlog of subscribers. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 14, 24 (statement of Andrew F.
Brimmer, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
107. See FED. REsERvE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 26. Notable exceptions arc the
early independent card plans-Diners' Club, American E.xprcss, and Carte Blancl1e.
These programs not only depend upon applications for participants, but also charge an
annual fee, a practice not followed in bank card plans. The card plans of many merchandising issuers, such as oil companies, initially relied upon solicitations of appli·
cations, but later switched to unsolicited mailings to selected groups.
108. A study undertaken by Shell Oil Company found that 38.3 per cent of those
persons who received unsolicited credit cards eventually used them, while only 14.4
per cent of those from whom applications were solicited ultimately activated card ac-
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thus appears that a competitive card program can be more rapidly
and cheaply established when cardholders are attracted by distribution of unsolicited cards.
Myriad factors will influence the long-run impact that the ban
of unsolicited mailings will have on competition. In many areas,
plans had been established prior to the prohibition, and the profit
potential for new entrants was already limited. The publicity surrounding the growth of credit card usage has increased the public's
familiarity with credit cards and lessened the resistance of potential
cardholders formerly encountered.100 In those areas in which new
card plans could operate profitably, other types of promotional efforts
to secure applicants may now be more productive. The success of the
unsolicited-mailing technique may have led issuers to underestimate
alternative marketing approaches. It is clear, however, that the statute has disrupted the operation of the credit card market: small and
potential issuers will be forced to resort to distribution techniques
that may be more costly than unsolicited mailings.11° Even if experimentation establishes the success of alternative approaches, there is
likely to be at least a short-run limitation on the number of new
entrants and growth of small issuers, thereby limiting the competition that existing programs will encounter.

2. The Scope of the Prohibition
The prohibition of the mailing of unsolicited cards is stated in
absolute terms: "No credit card shall be issued except in response
to a request or application therefor." 111 Exceptions are made in two
situations for issuances that have been preceded by the holder's
acceptance of a card: the prohibition "does not apply to the issuance
of a credit card in renewal of, or in substitution for, an accepted
counts. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 161. An earlier survey by an issuer
bank indicated a similar disparity. Nineteen per cent of unsolicited card recipients
activated accounts shortly after receipt, while only 0.66 per cent of those who were sent
application forms eventually applied for a card. See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra
note 3, at 76. This survey does not indicate the extent of card use among applicants.
The extent of the disparity in the surveys has been explained as an incident of the
early timing of the surveys and the nature of the promotional effort. See 1969 Senate
Hearings, supra note 39, at 110 (statements of Senator Proxmire and Thomas :Bailey,
American :Bankers Association).
109. Cf. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 110 (statement of Thomas :Bailey,
American :Bankers Association).
110. Some segments of the banking industry have expressed this concern. See 116
CONG. REc. 11834 (1970) (letter to Senator Hatfield from The Commercial :Bank, Salem,
Oregon).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra.
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credit card." 112 The former practice of mailing cards to persons
whose names were obtained from existing bank accounts, credit card
bureaus, or similar sources is ·no longer permissible. Questions do
remain, however, with respect to the breadth of the statutory prohibition.
A marketing technique occasionally used in the past was the
negative premailer, a printed promotion stating that a card would
be sent to the recipient unless he took affirmative action to inform
the issuer that the card was not desired. The question whether a
recipient's silence could be interpreted as a "request" under the
statutory standard is answered by the legislative history. Proposals to
permit such a technique were made at several stages in the evolution
of the statutory language.113 However, in presenting S. 721 on the
floor of the Senate, Senator Proxmire specifically noted that it was
intended to preclude use of the negative premailer.114 Thus, the
application of the prohibition to this practice seems clear.
Solicitations that are permitted include all forms of mail contact
requesting the recipient's participation in a plan. As long as affirmative action by the recipient is required to trigger the issuance of a
card, the contact will not violate the statutory prohibition.116 An
affirmative response made verbally, as in the course of a personal or
telephone solicitation, satisfies the statutory standard.110
Considerable attention was given to determining whether to
apply the mailing prohibition to a card issued in renewal of a previously issued unsolicited card. In a provision designed to limit the
competitive advantage derived by existing firms that had previously
issued unsolicited cards, the Senate Committee's version of S. 721
would have required the initial renewal of such cards to be made
pursuant to a request. 117 This requirement was removed by an
amendment on the Senate floor.11 8 While this history indicates the
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra.
113. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 114 (statement by Thomas
Bailey, American Bankers Association). Letters to Senator Hatfield indicate that he had
considered the inclusion of a provision permitting negative premailers. See note 110
supra.
, 114. 116 CoNG. REc. 11829 (1970).
115. Id.
116. One of the bills introduced in the House specifically provided that cards could
be sent only in response to a written request. See H.R. 15103, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969),
cited in 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 108, 119-20. This measure was not
seriously considered, and little attention was given to the requirement of a writing.
117. See 116 CONG. REc. 11827 (1970). See also S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Scss.
8 (1970).
118. 116 CONG. REC. 11832-34 (1970).

August 1972]

Federal Control of Credit Cards

1505

primary import of the renewal exception, the application of the
provision in one situation may generate confusion. A renewal card
may be issued only for an accepted card.119 This term is defined, in
part, to mean "any card which the cardholder has requested and
received or has signed or has used or authorized another to use." 120
An unsolicited card would, by definition, not meet the terms in the
first conjunctive since it would not have been "requested and received." Mere receipt amounts to acceptance only if a card has been
requested; therefore, an unsolicited card would be "accepted" only
upon being signed, used, or given to another person for use. While
an issuer could identify those persons who had used an unsolicited
card, the signing of a card or authorization of another's use would
not necessarily come to the issuer's attention. An appropriate regard
for caution should lead issuers to withhold renewals from all holders
of unsolicited cards except those whose cards had actually been
used. 121

3. Enforcement of the Prohibition
The version of the credit card statute that was finally adopted
by the Senate includes no express sanction for disobedience of the
prohibition of unsolicited mailings. 122 While the legislative history
of the provision does not indicate the manner in which violations
are to be treated, a variety of enforcement tools are available. The
credit card statute amended a chapter of the 1968 Truth-in-Lending
Act123 designed primarily to compel disclosure of interest and finance
charges in consumer credit transactions. The Truth-in-Lending Act,
therefore, contains the sanctions that were presumably intended to
apply to the limitation on distribution of unsolicited cards. But
while there are provisions in the Act for criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement, these do not all apply with equal force to the
credit card provisions. The criminal provisions, including punish119. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(1) (1970), set out in note 34 supra.
121. As might be expected, some banks adhere to a practice of not renewing cards
that are not used for extended periods of time. See 116 CONG. REc. 11834 (1970) (letter
to Senator Hatfield from The Commercial Banic, Salem, Oregon).
122. While most issuers have complied with the ban, there is still some basis for
concern. At least one oil company completed an unsolicited mailing after the effective
date of the Act. Interview with Randolph May, law student, Durham, N.C., May 13,
1970. This violation was apparently the result of insufficient information about the
existence of the ban. The statutory prohibition has necessitated administrative interpretations in other situations. See, e.g., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ,r,r 30,664,
30,807 (1972) (excerpts from Fed. Res. Bd. opinion letters).
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-Slt (1970).
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ment by fine and imprisonment, may be invoked for any willful and
knowing failure to comply with any requirement imposed under that
subchapter, which now encompasses the credit card provisions.124
The administrative enforcement procedures similarly apply to all
requirements imposed under the relevant subchapter.126 Violations
in industries within the jurisdiction of specified regulatory agencies
are enforceable by those agencies. Enforcement efforts against bank
credit card plans, for example, are to be undertaken by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and the Director of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.126 In industries not specifically enumerated, the Federal
Trade Commission is granted enforcement power.127 While some of
these agencies have become actively involved in enforcement of the
interest disclosure provisions of the Act, there has been only limited
administrative action under the mailing ban. This inactivity may
reflect general compliance with the proscription by the credit card
industry.
The Truth-in-Lending Act provides civil remedies for violation
of its provisions,128 but, because of the terminology of the section,
private recovery cannot extend to violations of the credit card distribution ban. The civil action is available only when there is a
failure to disclose any required information, and therefore cannot be
used to remedy violations of the mailing prohibition, which involves
no disclosure requirement. The absence of discussion of the enforcement question during the hearings and floor debate makes it uncertain that Congress actually meant to preclude the availability of a
private remedy. It cannot yet be determined whether the existence of
criminal sanctions and administrative relief provides adequate enforcement alternatives and compensates for the lack of civil remedies.
Although administrative enforcement of the Truth-in-Lending
Act is allocated to a diverse group of agencies, authority for the
promulgation of interpretive rulings is centralized. While the credit
card amendments do not specifically authorize administrative interpretations, a general provision of the Truth-in-Lending Act grants
authority to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
to promulgate regulations. 129 This authority includes the power not
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
Jg9.

15 u.s.c. § 1611(3) (1970).
15 u.s.c. § 1607 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(l) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
15 v.s.c. ~ 1604 (1970),
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only to interpret the Act, but also to make adjustments and exceptions in its operation. The legislative history of the credit card
amendments indicates a desire by the Board of Governors to limit
its rule-making responsibility in this area. 130 Nonetheless, the Board
continues to have interpretive authority under the amended Act,
which now extends to the adopted provisions relating to credit cards.
Indeed, the Board has issued amendments to its Regulation Z intended to assist the implementation of the statutory credit card
controls.131
The Board's initial regulations are primarily directed toward
the limitation on cardholder liability and present no significant
elaboration on the operation of the prohibition of unsolicited mailings. The regulations do, however, detail the manner in which state
statutory controls will be approved as an alternative means of regulating mailings. Pursuant to a provision of the Truth-in-Lending
Act, 132 state regulatory schemes will be operative if the Board finds
that they impose requirements "substantially similar" to those established by the Act.133 Upon Board approval, transactions subject to
state control are exempt from the operation of the Act. It is doubtful
that there will be any general effort by states to exercise their option
for local control. Prior to the adoption of the federal credit card
legislation, only a few states indicated an interest in controlling
unsolicited mailings. The statutes enacted attempted to limit cardholder liability for misuse of unsolicited cards and, thus, were more
limited in scope than the subsequent federal controls.134 Since any
130. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text. Since the enacted legislation relieved the Board of the responsibility for credit card regulations, that response might
be interpreted as indicating the Committee's intention to remove the Board from all
responsibility for control of credit cards, including that which would arise under the
more general delegation of authority under the Truth-in-Lending Act. The legislative
history, however, does not clearly indicate such an intention. The shift from a regulatory scheme to a statutory ban appears to have been as much a result of a desire to
make the statute more rigorous as a concession to the reluctance of the Board of Governors. Pressures to strengthen the bill came from several sources, including the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at
38-39 (statement by Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission). The
Committee acknowledged the influence of these suggestions in explaining its decision
to abandon the regulatory structure. See S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1970).
In addition, while the Committee minority assumed that the Board's role had been
removed, the floor sponsor of the measure acknowledged the availability of its residual
rule-making authority. See ll6 CoNG. R.Ec. II84-2 (1970) (statement by Senator Proxmire).
131. See 36 Fed. Reg. 1040, 1041 (1971).
132. 15 u.s.c. § 1633 (1970).
133. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(a)(l) (1971), as amended, 36 Fed. Reg. 1040-41 (1971).
134. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE ANN. § 1718 (West. Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121½, § 381 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 255, § 12E (Supp. 1971).
See generally Kennedy, supra note 33, at 44-47. Enactment of the state credit card laws
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new state control would likely be substantially duplicative, most
policies that would be promoted by state control are satisfied by
the federal enactment. The fact that Congress has assumed the
initiative in legislating in this area has reduced both the need and
incentive for state regulation. State control will probably be exercised only with respect to those businesses traditionally subject to
extensive state controls. Since few existing card issuers are of this
type, the majority of credit card transactions will no doubt remain
subject to direct federal regulation.

III.

CARDHOLDER LIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORIZED USE

Unlike the House measures, S. 721 also addressed the problem
of cardholder liability for unauthorized use. As ultimately enacted,
the statute provides that a cardholder bears no liability for the
misuse of his card by another person unless the issuer has previously
informed the cardholder of the liability provision, provided a prestamped, self-addressed notification-of-loss form, and issued a credit
card that contains a means of identifying the authorized user.
Even if the issuer satisfies these conditions, the cardholder's maximum liability is fifty dollars and, in any event, the cardholder is
not liable for losses sustained after he has notified the issuer.185
Prior to the statute, most issuers imposed upon cardholders the
legal responsibility for all unauthorized charges made until the cardholder had notified the issuer of the loss. 130 While issuers often did
not in fact seek to hold cardholders responsible to the extent permitted under the cardholder agreements,187 this legal framework
created the popular assumption that the loss allocation system placed
ultimate responsibility on individual cardholders. The statute fundamentally reverses this relationship by placing primary legal responsibility for fraud losses on issuers.
Some question remains, however, as to whether the mechanism
chosen for implementation of the new liability system is desirable
in light of its probable effectiveness. Achievement of the statutory
objectives depends largely upon cardholder awareness of the new
did not silence the complaints by consumers concerning credit card abuses, particularly
in the area of invasion of privacy. See 116 CONG, REc. S0876 (1970),
IS5. 15 U.S.C. § 164S(a) (1970), set out in note S4 supra. See also Note, Consumer
Protection-Credit Card Protection Under the Truth in Lending Act, 49 N.C. L. REv.
775 (1971).
IS6. See Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty To Read-Business Run by
IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1070,
1080 (1966); Bergsten, supra note 2, at 488-97.
lll7. See note 198 infra.
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rules that govern use of credit cards. But, dissemination of information about the statute is dependent upon action by the issuer. 138
Unfortunately, the statute fails to provide an adequate incentive for
the desired issuer response and, hence, undermines the effectiveness
of the limited liability provisions.
A.

The Rationale of the Statutory Liability System

The federal credit card statute reflects a policy decision that it is
preferable for the issuer to bear fraud losses arising from credit card
use. While the legislative history of the Act includes little commentary that documents the basis upon which this choice was made,
various considerations suggest its desirability.
A system of issuer liability is preferable because it stimulates
more efficient precautions against losses. 139 If issuers are made to bear
fraud losses, they will implement procedures controlling such costs
in order to preserve the profitability of their operations. The amount
they spend for loss control is a function of the amount of loss experienced: in an optimal situation, issuers will expend money for
loss control as long as each additional expenditure results in the prevention of losses of a greater amount. If cardholders were to bear
these losses individually, they, too, would respond with preventive
measures. But their responses would not be economically efficient;
their loss minimization measures would likely include unnecessary
and ineffective devices. 140 On the other hand, issuers have superior
access to information about the cost, frequency, and causes of fraud
losses. In addition, issuers are in a better position to control the
occun-ence of these losses. They not only select the merchants who
may accept the card and the holders who may use it, but also design
ll!S. See note 202 infra and accompanying text.
139. The argument is fully explored in Note, supra note 100, at 1423-28.
140. The decision to relieve individual cardholders of most responsibility for unauthorized charges, while readily supportable, represents a significant departure from
older notions of loss allocation. Common law liability concepts suggest that the card•
holder bears such losses because of his likely contribution to their occurrence. The
cardholder has control of the card and can seemingly guard against its misuse by
limiting the exposure to loss. Thus, because the cardholder is more likely than the
issuer to be "at fault" when unauthorized use occurs, he should accept responsibility
for his dereliction, even though it may not satisfy negligence principles.
To the extent that the statute continues a limited liability, see text accompanying
note 145 infra, it recognizes some need to stimulate protective cardholder behavior.
But its liability provisions represent a general rejection of traditional analysis. They
implicitly recognize that an inquiry into "fault" places too great an emphasis upon
the proximity of a party to the loss event. A more appropriate inquiry is the parties'
relative loss-control capacity. Viewed in this light, the question of loss allocation can
properly take account of the issuer's predominant role in shaping the system that
produces fraud losses.
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the security systems for card distribution, user identification,141 and
loss notification. Hence, the statutory choice of issuer liability assures
that the problem of credit card loss is the responsibility of the party
most likely to take efficient steps in its resolution.142
A system of issuer liability also ensures that fraud losses are spread
over a large number of transactions so that the impact on any one
cardholder is slight; the issuer initially accepts the loss and then
spreads it back to cardholders or merchants in the form of increased
service costs. Such a system is desirable because placing primary
liability on the holder of a card that is fraudulently used may impose
large, and potentially ruinous, costs on individuals.143 It is true that
under a system of cardholder liability, cardholders could agree among
themselves to spread fraud losses; this result is achieved when individual holders are joined together in an insurance plan. However,
insurance plans existing prior to the federal enactment indicate the
undesirability of this technique, for the insurance cost per card was
141. Photographs, code devices, and voice prints are possible identification tech•
niques. See Bergsten, supra note 2, at 506 (photographs); Coha, Credit Card Fraud,
BANKERS MONTHLY, June 15, 1967, at 24, 26-27 (code devices); Livingston, Banliing's
Role in a Credit Card Economy, BANKING, Sept. 1966, at 111, 112 (voice prints).
142. The loss allocation approach of the statute has been rejected by at least one
commentator. After an extensive review and criticism of liability-until-notice schemes,
the student author states: "As a basic premise, the most equitable methods [sic] of
distributing fraud loss is to spread it as evenly as possible among those parties who
derive benefits from the credit card system. Since both card issuers and cardholders
enjoy reciprocal benefits from the use of credit cards, it would seem reasonable for
them to equally absorb losses generated by their misuse." It is then proposed that all
cardholders of a particular issuer be assessed a proportionate part of fifty per cent of
the fraud losses experienced by the issuer. The remainder would be borne by the issuer
itself. See Comment, The Apportionment of Credit Fraud Losses, 4 U. CAL, (DAVIS)
L. REv. 377, 399 (1971).

In light of the limited attention that has been given to loss allocation questions,
this suggestion must be credited for its originality in attempting to resolve a difficult
question. The proposed solution must be rejected, however. The relative benefit derived
by cardholder and issuer from a credit card system would seem to be an inappropriate
foundation for loss allocation; for the evaluation, and indeed definition, of "benefit"
is largely normative and is not subject to resolution that withstands objective scrutiny,
Relatedly, this approach presumes that the providers and consumers of credit card
systems derive a similar utility that permits meaningful comparison, an assumption
that is doubtful. Finally, at the basis of the proposed system is the expectation that
the cardholders' costs will be limited to those assessed directly. The cardholders' costs
cannot, however, be so easily controlled. The issuer remains free to spread all or a
portion of the remainder of its losses to cardholders in the form of indirect costs, such
as larger merchant discounts, less convenient service, and so on. Under acceptable no•
tions of governmental regulation, it is simply not possible to dictate the extent of
cost-spreading in which the issuer will engage. It is, of course, feasible to rely upon
competitive pressures to limit the attractiveness of cost-spreading; this is the approach
taken by the federal credit card statute. But the result achieved under the statute is
much less perfect than that required for the system proposed in the above Comment,
143. 1969 Senate Hearings, mpra note 39, at 63-75 (statement of Robert Meade, Di•
rector, Legislative Affairs, President's Committee on Consumer Interests); Note, supra
note 100, at 1426 &: nn.50 &: 52.
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significantly higher than that incurred under a more perfect lossspreading system. 144 Therefore, in order to minimize the impact
of each loss occurrence in the most efficient manner, the issuer's
superior knowledge and cost-spreading position are a more appropriate basis for a loss distribution scheme.
The new credit card law does not create an absolute issuerliability system, for the cardholder may be held liable for up to fifty
dollars resulting from unauthorized uses. This limited cardholder
liability is commonly justified on twu bases. First, the prospect of
potential liability is intended to operate as an incentive to the cardholder to give the issuer prompt notice of loss.145 The incentive is
provided by the fact that the cardholder may limit his liability to
less than the statutory maximum; he bears liability only for unauthorized charges made prior to notification. Second, the provision for
partial cardholder liability serves to encourage a cardholder to exercise proper care in the use and protection of his card; ·without such
care the amount of fraud loss incurred by the issuer would increase.
The congressional objective was to implement a regulatory scheme
that limits cardholder liability without at the same time increasing
the economic and social costs resulting from unauthorized use of
credit cards. The optimal balance in the statutory structure can be
obtained if the cardholder incurs only the degree of liability necessary to ensure proper control of his card and prompt notice of loss
to the issuer.
144. Note, supra note 100, at 1427-28.
The author estimated that the average loss per card is $0.25 per year. Assuming
that the average family has six credit cards, insurance costs range from $0.45 per card
for minimum protection to $1.33 per card for coverage adequate in most cases.
The estimate of $0.25 fraud loss per card may be too large. It was based on an
assumption of then current nationwide fraud losses of 50 million dollars, TIME, Nov.
24, 1967, at 80. The absence of a systematic method for calculating such losses is reflected in the disparity of other contemporary estimates. The range has been placed
at 20 to 30 million dollars, Bergsten, supra note 2, at 487; 40 million dollars, Maidenberg, Personal Finance: Holders of Credit Cards Are Warned That Losing Them
Can Prove Costly, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1967, at 69, col. 3; 20 to 50 million dollars,
Coha, supra note 141, at 24. More recent estimates have tun as high as 150 million
dollars, 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of Representative Nix).
The fraud losses of the Midwest Bank Card System, after start-up difficulties had
been overcome, has been stated to be 0.12" per cent. Id. at 91, 97 (testimony of Earl
Pollock, Midwest Bank Card System, Inc., characterizing its recent performance as "enviable"). If this figure were projected over the entire industry for 1967, see note 45
supra, nationwide fraud losses for that year would have been approximately 14 million
dollars. In fact, 1967 fraud losses may have been considerably higher due to the initial
experience of the Chicago banks, see notes 9-30 supra. and accompanying text. The
statistics available for most issuers do not distinguish benvecn fraud and credit losses.
See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 32; 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14,
at 230 (re1;>ort of losses by Shell Oil Co.)
145. Note, supra note 100, at 1426. See also 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at
71, 73 (statement of Professor Willier, National Consumer Law Center, Boston College);
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In seeking this balance, difficulties are encountered in determining the level of exposure to loss necessary to produce the desired
cardholder response. The statute provides that a cardholder may bear
up to fifty dollars liability for each -card that he owns. If a number of
cards are lost at one time, the aggregate loss faced by the cardholder
may be significant. The liability necessary to induce notice and care
is probably not related to the number of cards lost. A potential
liability sufficient to stimulate cardholder action when one card is
lost should suffice to prompt the same response when three or four
cards have been lost. While this suggests that it may have been preferable to establish a potential liability for each incidence of loss
rather than for each card involved, such a scheme would create significant administrative difficulties. In the event of loss of several
cards, a number of different issuers would have potential claims
against the cardholder. If the latter's liability were limited to fifty
dollars, it would be necessary either to divide the amount of liability
between several independent claimants or to select an issuer whose
claim was to be preferred. The operating costs of such a system might
be excessive and, to the extent that distribution of cardholder loss
results in a complicated administrative structure, the potential for
confusion among cardholders as to their responsibility for loss is
increased.
B.

The Operation of the Statutory Liability Limitation

Once the decision has been made to limit a cardholder's liability
for unauthorized use, a mechanism to effectuate that choice is necessary. The provisions of the federal credit card statute attempt to
define the scope and operation of the new cardholder protection.
Legislative directives have been provided for many of the policy
choices that have to be made. Thus, the drafters sought to define the
information that issuers must convey to cardholders,140 the steps
cardholders must take in giving the issuer notification of the loss
of a card,147 and the types of credit devices subject to statutory
1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 225, 226-27 (submission of W. J. Bittles, Jr.,
General Manager of Retail Marketing, Shell Oil Co., urging the adoption of a $100
liability limit).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1602G) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. The Federal Reserve Board
has indicated that acceptable notice may take the following form:
You may be liable for the unauthorized use of your credit card (or other term
which describes the credit device). You will not be liable for unauthorized use
which occurs after you notify (name of card issuer or his designee) at (address)
orally or in writing of loss, theft, or possible unauthorized use. In any case liability
shall not exceed (insert-$50 or any lesser amount under other applicable law or
under any agreement with the cardholder).
36 Fed. Reg. 1041 ·(1971).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. The Federal Reserve Board

Federal Control of Credit Cards

August 1972]

1513

control. 148 There are, however, a number of questions concerning
the operation of the statute that have not been adequately resolved.
In many areas, insufficient attention was given to the potential difficulties that might arise in implementation. Several of these problem
areas involve matters of fundamental importance in achieving a
workable statutory scheme. The discussion that follows pursues some
of the important questions raised by the statute.

I.

Transactional Exemption for Business Use

The federal credit card enactment was added as an amendment
to the previously adopted Truth-in-Lending Act. This graft of the
credit card provision onto a statute designed to control other credithas interpreted the statute to mean that the preaddressed, prestamped, notificationof-loss form provided by the issuer is not the exclusive means by which notification may be given, 36 Fed Reg. 1041 (1971). The Board's Regulations also provide
that a notice made in writing "shall be considered given at the time of receipt or,
whether or not received, at the expiration of the time ordinarily required for transmission, whichever is earlier.'' Id.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(k) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. The applicability of the
fifty-dollar liability limitation to traditional credit cards such as oil company and bank
cards is clear, but its effect upon other types of instruments requires analysis of the
statutory definition. An illustrative device is the card issued to telephone subscribers.
Although popularly referred to as "credit cards," these have a different function than
the traditional charge plate. The latter must usually be submitted to the merchant at
the time of sale, but telephone services may be purchased on the mere oral presentation
of information on the card. Requests for service are accepted without the issuer or
seller verifying the existence of a card. That which entitles the user to credit is not
the card itself, but rather the information on it. Since the card itself is not needed to
transmit that information, such "card" does not appear to exist "for the purpose of
obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit" as required by 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(k) (1970).
The nature of the statutory scheme further suggests that it was not intended to
apply to telephone "credit cards.'' While the drafters required that issuers include
on the card a means of identification, the techniques contemplated were such things
as siguature blocks and photographs. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 80,
85, 92 (testimony of Professor Bergsten, University of Iowa, College of Law); 116 CONG,
REc. 11841 (1970) (statement of Senator Percy). These techniques will not prevent loss
when the card itself is not presented during the transaction. The intent seems to have
been to cover only cards on which more reliable identification techniques would protect the authorized user against loss. Such an identification mechanism might be devised
for telephone cards, but the legislative history does not indicate that Congress had one
in mind. The implication is that only the traditional cards are included within the
statutory coverage.
Other identification devices raise similar questions. For example, many banks issue
check guarantee cards that resemble credit cards in their size and content. They enable
the holder to cash checks with merchants or banks with whom the holder has had no
previous contact. Under some guarantee plans, the holder may use the card to cash a
check even though an overdraft is created in the account. A card that gives this privilege may be said to exist "for the purpose of obtaining money ••• on credit," even
if a particular holder uses his guarantee card only when his checking account balance
is sufficient to cover the checks he writes. In the more typical plan, however, the card
is only identification, and the user is not permitted to overdraw his account. The check
guarantee card that gives no credit privilege is not within the statutory definition, and
its misuse is not subject to the statutory limitations.
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related practices has produced significant interpretive problems.
For example, the Truth-in-Lending Act exempts from its coverage
"[c]redit transactions involving extensions of credit for business or
commercial purposes . . . or to organizations."149 The credit card
statute does not offer specific directives concerning the manner in
which the liability limitations are to be applied to cards that are used
for both business and nonbusiness purposes; the common practice
of using one card for these dual purposes increases the importance of
the interpretation given to the transactional exemption. 1u0
A threshold question in the determination of the application of
the transactional exemption to these hybrid cards involves identification of the point at which an "extension of credit" is made. In the
amended statute, the term "credit" is defined to include "the right
... to incur debt and defer its payment."11i1 Therefore, credit exists
under the statute not only when a current purchase is made, but
also in situations where the right to defer payment extends to future
or potential indebtedness. As applied to credit cards, this suggests
that credit is extended at the time the card is issued, for that event
creates the cardholder's right to apply the card to deferred payment
purchases. By issuing the card, the credit card company has endowed
the holder with authority to establish a debtor relationship with the
issuer.152
Under this interpretation of "extension of credit," the application of the statutory exemption is clear in some cases. For example,
the Federal Reserve Board expressed the view that the liability lim149. 15 u.s.c. § 1603(1) (1970).
150. The Federal Reserve Board has indicated that it regards the business-purposes
exemption of section 104 as applicable to transactions involving credit cards. See 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDrr GUIDE ,r 30,682 (1971) (excerpts from Fed. Res. Bd. letter of June 3,
1971, No. 483, by Griffith L. Garwood, Chief, Truth-in-Lending Section): id. ,i 30,708
(excerpts from Fed. Res. Bd. letter of July 15, 1971, No. 505, by Griffith L. Ganvood).
But a hearing examiner for the Federal Trade Commission has rejected a similar con•
tention made by a firm attempting to justify its promotion of a credit card protection
scheme. See Credit Card Serv. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 11 19,967, at 21,987,
21,988 (April 13, 1972).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1970) (emphasis added).
152. It would be possible to argue that credit is extended not at the time of issuance
of a card, but rather at the time the card is actually used to purchase goods and services.
This theory leads to unreasonable results when applied to doctrines of credit card mis•
use. Assuming that an unauthorized user makes purchases for his business or commer•
cial purpose, under this view the limited-liability provisions of the credit card statute
would not be available to the cardholder because the card had been used for business
or commercial purposes. Aside from the difficulties attendant to any theory relying on
the subjective intent or purpose of an unauthorized user (a class of persons notorious
for their unavailability at the time their testimony is needed), an interpretation of tl1e
statute that would deny the statutory protection to a cardholder according to the pur•
poses for which a thief used the credit card stretches the business purpose envisioned
by Congress beyond tlle breaking point.
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itation is inapplicable to credit cards that can be used only in connection with business activity.153 The limitation to business use may
be established upon issuance of the card either from the nature of
the card or from limitations established by the cardholder. Illustratively, the card may be issued to business firms solely for use by
employees in business related travel and entertainment.
In many situations, however, it cannot be determined at the time
of issuance whether a card represents an extension of credit for business or commercial purposes. Many individuals secure general purpose credit cards and use them to make both personal and business
purchases. The statute does not provide guidance for determining
its application to situations involving mixed uses. This may therefore be an appropriate occasion for the Federal Reserve Board to
exercise its rule-making authority. The availability of liability protection could be determined by the purpose for which the card is
primarily or most frequently used. Under this standard, occasional
or insubstantial personal use would not be sufficient to defeat the
statutory exclusion.154 The test would be most difficult to applyand justify-in situations where business and personal uses were
nearly evenly divided.
Some cases obviously will raise difficult evidentiary problems.
The cardholder, who has principal control of the evidence relevant
to a determination of the purpose of his prior uses, also has a strong
incentive to characterize his uses to fall within the coverage of the
statute.155 In addition, when the unauthorized use occurs before the
card has been used extensively, there may be no pattern of usage
sufficient to provide evidence of the cardholder's primary purpose
in securing the card. In this situation, the cardholder's own classification of his intention may provide the sole basis for determining
applicability of the statute.
153. See 4 CCH CONSUMER Crurorr GumE ,r 30,682 (1971) (excerpts from Fed. Res. Bd.
letter of June 3, 1971, No. 483, by Griffith L. Garwood).
154. In most cases, the facts necessary to determine the predominant use can be ob•
tained by reference to the card.holder's history of use.
155. There are other considerations apart from the statute that will affect both the
card.holder's characterization of his use and the availability of tangible evidence of prior
uses. In many situations, the card.holder will seek to classify charges incurred with a
credit card as business expenses in order to take advantage of the federal income tax
deduction. See INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 162(a), 212. In addition, since most business
deductions must be supported by adequate documentation, the tax law creates an incentive for the cardholder to preserve sales slips and other evidence of the nature of
the transaction. See, e.g., INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 274(d). Thus, with respect to authorized charges, the cardholder will typically have an interest in categorizing his business uses as such. However, if a particular card has been misused, the incentives created
by the tax law may disappear in light of the advantage that the card.holder receives
from opposite characterization of his uses. While the cardholder's past tax records may
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As long as a distinction is maintained between business and consumer transactions, there is the potential for confusion among cardholders regarding the availability of the statutory protection. If he
were aware of the nonavailability of the liability limitation, a cardholder might segregate his business card accounts and take special
measures to protect them from loss. He might, for example, insure
his business cards or exercise particular care in handling them. It
would seemingly be appropriate for the Federal Reserve Board to
devise regulatory measures to protect the cardholder's interest in
these situations. The Board should require the card issuer to disclose
the statutory exemption for business use to its cardholders. The issuer might also be compelled to offer an option of establishing a
separate account for business transactions. 150 Other protections could
be achieved through judicial construction of the statute. The issuer
could be made to bear the burden of shmving that the test for determining statutory coverage had not been met. 167 In addition, an
issuer who had informed cardholders that they had only limited
liability for unauthorized use might be precluded from subsequently
asserting the inapplicability of the statute. Unfortunately, such a
rule will further reduce the already inadequate incentive for issuer
participation in the disclosure scheme.168
Although the treatment of business transactions may be clarified
by administrative rule-making, the legislative history of the credit
card provision reveals no explicit recognition of this limitation by
not be subject to manipulation, there nonetheless will be many situations in which tl1e
cardholder will respond to the incentive of the credit card law-as where the acquisi•
tion of a particular card is fairly recent, the cardholder has chosen not to itemize his
tax deductions, and so on.
156. While this option may be presently available, the measure suggested would be
structured to ensure publicity of the option to the business user.
157. This result draws some support from statutory provisions allocating tl1e burden
of proof in related controversies. The issuer bears tile burden of showing "tllat tl1e use
was authorized or, if tlle use was unautllorized ••• tllat tile conditions of liability , ••
set forth in [§ I643(a)] have been met." 15 U.S.C. § I643(b) (1970), set out in note 34
supra. While this provision does not address itself to the burden of proof in situations
not covered by tlle statute, it presents a congressional preference for offering further
protection to cardholders by requiring issuers to make the aflirmatiye showing of tlleir
right of recovery.
It might be argued, of course, tllat Congress intended tllis additional protection to
apply only when the statute was otllenvise applicable and that, by implication, the
burden of proof should rest on the cardholder in other situations. However, when the
issue of statutory coverage is itself in question, it seems consistent witll -tlle general
congressional design to create a procedural rule tllat will offer ma'Cimum protection to
cardholders.
158. See notes 195-208 infra and accompanying text. However, by protecting issuers
who do accurately explain the limitations on statutory coverage, such a construction
may make it worthwhile for issuers to disclose openly tile exemption to their card·
holders.
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Congress,159 and policy considerations do not necessarily support the
distinctions drmm between business and personal use. For example,
the evidentiary difficulties generated by application of the business
exclusion may impair the efficiency with which cardholder protections are administered. A more fundamental objection is that the
business nature of usage does not necessarily provide a rational basis
for denying the protection of the Act. The potential for burdensome
cardholder liability may be equally great whether the card is used
for personal or business purposes. Thus, an individual cardholder
may be unable to absorb any significant fraud loss regardless of
whether it flows from a business rather than a personal credit card.160
While some businesses obligated to accept liability for unauthorized
uses will be able to spread such losses adequately, that ability is not a
necessary result of the cardholder's commercial status. Moreover,
the business nature of the user is irrelevant to the relative capacity
of the cardholder and issuer to control losses. Even businesses with a
good loss-spreading potential are likely to be less efficient loss controllers than card issuers.161
In order to achieve the statutory objective of consumer protection, the business credit cards of the cardholder should also be
covered by the statutory liability limitation. Requiring the business159. Neither the hearings nor the floor debate indicate that enactment of S. 721
was undertaken with an appreciation of the effect of the business purpose exemption
of 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1970). Indeed, one source involved in the legislative evolution of
the Senate bill has implied that no such limitation was intended, utilization of the
framework of the Truth-in-Lending Act being only a matter of "drafting convenience."
!16 CONSUMER REPORTS 645 (Nov. 1971). The caption of S. 721 may suggest the contrary,
however; it describes the bill as one "to safeguard the consumer." S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969) (emphasis added). Many of the statements made in support of the measure
considered only its effect on consumers. See ll6 CoNG. R.Ec. ll828, !10874-77, 30884-85
(1970),
While the classification "consumer" need not conclusively denote only personal activities to the e.xclusion of those of a business nature, the association has been made
in both common parlance and unrelated statutes. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-109(1) (consumer goods defined as those purchased primarily for personal, family, or
household use).
160. In many situations, the cardholder has the attributes of both a businessman
and a consumer in that he accepts responsibility for both types of transactions. While
the purpose of the credit card provisions was to afford financial protection to consumers, the protection given the cardholder in his consumer activities may be readily
undermined by the absence of protection for his business activities. Thus, the consumer
affairs of the junior executive who loses his business air-travel card may be completely
disrupted if he has to absorb losses for subsequent unauthorized uses of his card.
It is true that in most situations charges against business cards of corporate employees
may initially be paid by the firm. However, since the statute does not prevent the
corporate cardholder from transferring liability back to the authorized card user, the
firm may seek to hold the individual employee responsible for card misuse.
161. Cf. notes 139-44 supra and accompanying text. The card issuer presumably
could also control business card losses more efficiently.
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man to bear the responsibility for unauthorized card uses unnecessarily muddles the congressional scheme of loss allocation. Since no
strong policy supports application of the transactional exemption to
the credit card amendment, the operation of the statute should be
modified, by congressional amendment or by Federal Reserve Board
rule, to permit the application of the liability limitation to business
credit cards.
2.

The Determination of Agency Status

The three traditional agency concepts of actual, implied, and
apparent authority are employed to determine those instances when
cardholders receive the insulation of the limited liability provisions
of the statute.162 If the unauthorized user of the card does not have
authority in one of these forms, the cardholder will incur no more
than fifty dollars liability, provided he secures no benefit from the
transaction. The use of the agency framework in the credit card
statute is unfortunate in some respects. Many agency concepts were
originally developed to characterize relationships created in a business context. The relationship that leads to use of a credit card by
persons other than the cardholder is often much more personal.
Thus, such concepts as authorization and manifestation suggest a
formality that does not usually exist in credit card transfers. Moreover, the body of case law that gave rise to agency principles does
not speak directly to the types of situations in which one relinquishes
control of a simple, readily accepted credit device. Despite its commercial origins, however, the law of agency does admit of considerable flexibility, a characteristic that may ultimately be employed to
minimize interpretive difficulties.
The concepts of actual and implied authority are closely related.163 They refer to the "power of the agent to affect the legal
relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent to him." 164 The determinant of this
power, and the characteristic that distinguishes it from apparent authority, is the manifestation made by the principal directly to the
agent. A specific direction given by the principal creates actual or
express authority. But often the principal does not specify in detail
162.
163.
general
(1957).
164.

15 U.S.C, § 1602(0) (1970), set out itl note 34 supra.
Indeed, the statutory usage counters a trend to join the two terms under the
concept of "authority." See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7, comment c
Id. § 7. See also

w. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8 (1964).
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what an agent may properly do; thus, the limitation of the agent's
authority is often supplied by an inductive process. The principal
will be bound not only by the transaction that he directly authorized
his agent to enter, but also by other transactions that were by implication condoned in the original grant. The scope of the power
that will be implied is determined by the generality of the actual
manifestation, custom, and the relationship of the parties.165
Without an initial manifestation by the cardholder, there can
be no implied authority for use. Consequently, when the actual user
of the card has stolen the card or picked it up after the cardholder
has misplaced it, the concepts of actual and implied authority have
no application. But many situations arise in which the cardholder
gives someone limited permission to use his card. 166 These instances
may require a determination of the scope of proper uses that may
reasonably be implied. Since a card may be used to purchase a variety
of merchandise at a number of outlets, it is necessary to determine
whether there are limitations on the types of goods and services that
may be secured, the locations in which the card may be used, the
amount of charges that may be incurred, or the number of uses that
are contemplated. Illustratively, assume that A lends B his car and
gasoline credit card and tells B that he may use the car to take his
family on a Sunday afternoon pleasure drive. The transfer does not
give B implied authority to use the card for lodging or to purchase
food. More difficult questions, however, are whether the card may be
used for automotive products and services other than routine purchases of gasoline and oil. Since the contemplated trip is of short
duration, there is probably no implied authority for periodic servicing, such as oil changes. Should a minor defect develop, such as
a fiat tire, the card could seemingly be used in order to allow B to
complete his return trip. But because A's largess did not contemplate
extended use or expensive purchases, there would likely be no authority to use the card for major repairs. Unfortunately, since the
initial manifestation of consent for credit card use is often made
informally, it typically will not produce an extensive statement of
the user's actual authority. Hence, to determine the extent of implied authority, an attempt must be made to construct a relationship
between the parties. The multitude of agency cases provide a basis
for analogies. But, as the above example illustrates, situational pecu165. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7, comment c (1957).
166. See Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Viser, 140 S.2d 762 (La. App. 1962): Socony Mobil
Oil Co. v. Greif, 10 App. Div. 2d 119, 197 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1960); Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (I'ex. Civ. App. 1943).
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liarities will ultimately determine the scope of actual and implied
authority.
Actual and implied authority may, however, be of little importance in the majority of cases involving the limited liability provision. The concept of apparent authority may make it unnecessary to
refine precisely the limits of implied authority. Apparent authority,
like the other agency concepts, is created by a manifestation of the
principal, but unlike actual and implied authority, the basis of apparent authority is a manifestation to the party with whom the
agent deals. More specifically, it is an expression that reasonably
leads the party to believe that the actions of another will bind the
principal.167 Because the scope of this authority is determined from
the perspective of the person providing the goods or services, the
limits of authority to which the principal and agent expressly agreed
or which may be implied from their relationship are not necessarily
controlling. Rather, the important factor is the appearance of authority that the principal allows to develop.168
In many instances of credit card use by persons other than the
cardholder, the fact that the user was given even a modicum of
authority to use a card will significantly affect whether the user's
apparent authority extends beyond the originally intended authorization. Despite the absence of direct contact between the cardholder
and the merchant who honors it, authorized control of the card by
the user may itself be a sufficient manifestation to others to create an
obligation in the cardholder. An important element of this creation
of apparent authority is the cardholder's initial consent to the transfer and use. Thus, although specific agency precedent is lacking, it is
unlikely that mere possession of the card would be regarded as a
manifestation attributable to the cardholder where his relinquishment was involuntary, as in the case of theft.
It is traditionally posited that the agent's possession of property
may create authority for him to deal with it if "other facts" are
present.169 Several characteristics of credit card transactions supply
those facts. The credit card is a device designed to secure goods and
services upon credit; mere use of the card provides no occasion for
suspicion by a merchant. Moreover, by custom, credit cards are freely
accepted in commercial transactions. The cardholder who relinquishes possession should reasonably anticipate that the card might
167. REsl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
LAW OF AGENCY § 8, at 13 (1964).

§ 8 (1957); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE

168. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF AGENCY
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 18, 22 (1964).

§§ 27, 49 (1957);

w. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK

169. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 49, comment d (1957).
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be presented in payment for a wide range of goods or services. When
he does not intend that result, the cardholder may be obligated to
take steps to ensure that others are aware of the limitation he intends.170 Therefore, although the cardholder may desire to grant only
limited authority for use, he should appreciate that once control of
the card is relinquished little can be done to confine the use of the
card to those transactions originally contemplated. From the perspective of the merchant who will be asked to honor the card, authority
for particular limited uses cannot be distinguished from general
authority, unless, of course, the merchant has knowledge of other
circumstances that limit the user's authority. 171
Two cases decided prior to enactment of the federal credit card
statute suggest a judicial inclination toward this view that the cardholder bears liability for all reasonable purchases made by another
who has been given control of the holder's card. In Neiman-Marcus
Co. v. Viser,172 the cardholder gave his card to his wife upon the
commencement of their short-lived marriage, and subsequently paid
for one series of purchases charged against his account. Two months
later, the couple separated, but three days thereafter the cardholder's
wife made the additional purchases that were the subject of the litigated collection effort. The court, viewing the Ii.ability question as
resolved by agency principles, concluded: "The delivery of the
'Charga-Plate' by Viser to his wife constituted an authorization for
the purchases made by her and for their charge to his account."173
170. Results in particular cases will be affected by the user's ability to create an
appearance of authority by representations of his power to act. See R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 27, comment c, & 165 (1957). Under section 165, the principal is
liable if the user-agent has apparent authority and subsequently represents to a third
person that he has authorized control of the card. Id. § 165, comment a. However, the
principal's liability never arises if the third person has reason to know that the agent
is not acting for the principal's benefit. Id. § 166, comments c & d.
171. For example, if an employee of the cardholder has repeatedly used the latter's
card to purchase gasoline and oil for a company automobile from a particular service
station operator, the limited nature of these purchases may negate the reasonableness
of a belief by the operator that the employee has authority to use the card to purchase
service for his own automobile. But as to other merchants with whom the employee
has not previously dealt, authorized possession of the card may be a manifestation sufficient to support liability for most other uses. Other limitations upon cardholder responsibility may appear in particular circumstances. The nature of typical credit card
uses presents one such limitation. While a card potentially might be used to acquire
anything that an issuer may permit, custom suggests that a merchant should conclude
that there is apparent authority only for purchases that are not of abnormal size or
frequency in relation to the likely consumption patterns of the nominal cardholder.
Hence, if the user made many large transactions in a short period of time, or bought
goods in unusual quantities, it might be found that the cardholder's manifestation
could not reasonably encompass such transactions. Cf. Duke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
433 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
172. 140 S.2d 762 (La, App. 1962).
173. 140 S.2d at 765.
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Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan 174 reaches a similar result with
respect to charges made by two persons to whom the cardholder had
given his oil company card. Although initial charges made against
the card were for the benefit of the holder, the cardholder unsuccessfully resisted liability for purchases for which he received no
benefit and that were made after he attempted to dissuade his transferees from continued use of the card. 176 In both of these cases, the
court held the cardholder liable despite violation of express or implicit limitations upon the scope of permissible uses of the actual
user. Having knowingly and approvingly relinquished control of a
credit card, the cardholder was responsible for all charges until he
took appropriate action to terminate the apparent authority. Because
it incorporates the concept of apparent authority, the federal credit
card law is likely to be applied with a similar analytical result.
3.

Unauthorized but Beneficial Use

A superficial reading of the statute suggests that if the issuer
has complied with the statutory requirements, a cardholder has some
liability for all subsequent uses of his card. Under this construction,
the extent of cardholder liability is dependent upon whether the
use is unauthorized. If it is unauthorized, the cardholder is responsible for no more than fifty dollars of the charges improperly
made. It would seem to follow that if the transaction is not unauthorized, the cardholder bears full liability even though the
transaction involves use of the card by a third party. While this
assessment of credit card liability has the seeming certainty of obviousness, a closer analysis reveals that there may be intermediate
situations in which a use does not meet the statutory definition of
unauthorized use, but nonetheless does not warrant the imposition
of liability on the cardholder for the total value of the transaction.
The statute establishes a conjunctive relationship between the
absence of authority and benefit to the cardholder; a use is "unauthorized" by statutory definition only if undertaken by another
party acting without authority and if the cardholder receives no
benefit.176 It follows by implication that an "authorized" use is either
one in which the user has authority or one from which the cardholder receives benefit. Thus, the statute can be read to mean
174. 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
175. The court did not frame the relationship of the cardholder and his transferees
in agency terms. Moreover, the decision was aided by a contract term that obligated
the holder for all charges made prior to the return of the card. 168 S.W.2d at 881.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(0) (1970), set out in note 34 supra.
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that the mere receipt of benefit from another's unauthorized use,
even when conferred without authority, obligates the cardholder to
reimburse the issuer. Under this interpretation, the extent of cardholder liability would not be subject to the statutory limitation because the definition of an unauthorized use would not have been
satisfied; while there was no authority for the use, the situation was
not one "from which the cardholder receives no benefit."177 Hence,
this view seemingly presumes that the cardholder's liability would
extend to the full amount of the charges.
Despite the symmetry of this interpretation, courts should avoid
the temptation to base a finding of full liability upon the mere receipt of benefit by the cardholder. Such an interpretation can be
rejected on a number of grounds. Properly viewed, the statute was
not intended as a complete guide for determining the liability of a
cardholder for transactions undertaken with his card by other persons. The credit card legislation is not designed as a comprehensive
statement of cardholder liability for authorized transactions; rather,
the definitions were structured to deal only with problems peculiar
to unauthorized uses. Significantly, the legislative history of the measure indicates no congressional intention to impose full liability for
misuses simply because they produce benefit. Drafters of the legislatfon apparently assumed that a cardholder would have at most
only partial liability for the fraudulent diversion of his card.178 Finally, and most importantly, the notion that mere receipt of benefit
renders one fully liable runs counter to significant-and desirable
-precedent that has developed under the law of restitution. If a
benefit is not returnable, as will most likely be the case when credit
card purchases are involved,179 there is considerable support for relieving the unsuspecting beneficiary of liability. It is generally accepted that while an individual who himself secures services from
another by fraud is clearly accountable, one receiving nonreturnable
benefits of another's fraud incurs no liability.180 Other more general
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(0) (1970), set out in note 34 supra.
178. See S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970); 116 CoNG. REc. 11829-30,
11842 (1970) (comments of Senators Proxmire and Percy).
179. Although precise statistics on the types of purchases made with credit cards
are not available, many of the purchases made by unauthorized users will either be
services that arc immediately consumed or goods that the user appropriates for himself.
Neither of these situations presents the interpretive difficulty discussed here. Illustrative
of the definitional problem, however, is a case in which the unauthorized user secures
repairs or services for the cardholder's property-his car, appliances, or similar items.
Such a case will most probably involve an unauthorized user who is a member of the
cardholdcr's family, a fact that may justify the application of principles other than
those discussed in the text. See notes 185-86 infra and accompanying text.
180. See REsrATEMENT OF REsnTurION § 40, comment b (1936). This conclusion is
underscored by an illustration to comment b:
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principles confirm this result. Thus, liability for restitution will not
be found if the cardholder-beneficiary did not have an opportunity
to decline the benefit before it was performed,181 to negotiate the
terms of the performance,182 or to disaffirm the performance after
its completion.183 A similar result can be expected if the benefit did
not satisfy a legal or moral obligation of the cardholder.184
Most situations involving unauthorized card use will not raise
the question of the effect of the cardholder's receipt of benefit. When
it does arise, it will likely involve an unauthorized user who is a
member of the cardholder's family. Unfortunately, the statute is
particularly susceptible to an erroneous reading in this situation.
Many issuers apparently feel that a cardholder should be held responsible for misuse of his card by anyone within his household. Indeed,
an issuers' association has suggested that the reference to an absence
of benefit in the definition of "unauthorized use" was intended to
exclude from the statute uses "by a member of the family or household of the cardholder."185 There is, however, no evidence that such
misuses were intended to be excluded as a class. The mere fact of a
familial relationship between cardholder and user does not suggest
a basis for imposing liability, and these cases should be treated under
the same principle that governs other applications of the statute. The
cardholder will be liable in many of these situations because the
family member's use is accompanied by sufficient indicia of authority
to bind the cardholder. Other cases may present facts that justify
imposing full liability upon the cardholder, as where the unauRepresenting that he is the employment agent of A, but in fact without power to
bind A, B employs C to remodel A's house in A's absence. A has never requested
such work to be done. C is not entitled to restitution from A for the value of
work upon or materials incorporated into A's house.
While a few cases suggest a contrary result (see, e.g., First Natl. Bank v. Obeme, 121
ill. 25, 7 N.E. 85 (1886)), most are in agreement. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Ford, 188 Md.
658, 53 A.2d 665 (1947); Davis Estate v. West Clayton Realty Co., 338 Mo. 69, 89
S.W.2d 22 (1935); Green v. Messing, 236 App. Div. 107, 258 N.Y.S. 82 (1932); Cascaden
v. Magryta, 247 Mich. 267, 225 N.W. 511 (1929).
181. See Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND, L.
REv. 1183, 1198-99 (1966).

182. See R.EsrATEMENT OF R.EsrITUTION § 40, comment a (1936).
183. Id. § 40, comment b.
184. Id. §§ 40(d), 112-17 (1936).
185. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 156, 159 (statement of Midwest Dank
Card System, Inc.). Issuers and their attorneys have recognized the special problems
raised by intrafamily disputes involving credit cards. See, e.g., R. CLONTZ, TRUTIMN•
!.ENDING MANUAL 210-11 (Supp. 1972); Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study of the
Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 8ll, 830 (1967); Soutl1, Legal
Steps and Pitfalls in Bank Credit Cards, 87 BANKING L.J. 222, 236-37 (1971); 1969
Senate Hearings, supra, at 103, 106 (testimony of Thomas Bailey, American Bankers
Association).
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thorized family user secures necessities that the cardholder might
have otherwise been obligated to provide.186 But these can be dealt
with under general agency and restitutory concepts, and do not
undermine the broad principle that the statute is not properly
read as giving rise to general cardholder liability upon mere receipt
of benefit.
The question remains as to what the cardholder's liability should
be for another's use which, although without authority, produces a
nonreturnable benefit to the cardholder. While, as suggested above,
total liability is inappropriate, the cardholder's liability cannot be
limited by a literal application of the statutory provisions because
the presence of benefit means that the use is not "unauthorized."
It might be held that the cardholder has no liability at all, but this
result is anomalous in light of the whole liability scheme of the
statute that allows the imposition of a portion of fraudulent charges
on the cardholder. Instead, the statutory reference to "benefit" could
be construed in a restrictive sense to mean only such benefit as would
give rise to a restitutory obligation. Thus, a use would be unauthorized, and subject to the statute, if it were without authority
and produced no benefit for which the cardholder would be obligated under general principles of restitution. Because this construction is not evident from the face of the statute, there, is a substantial
possibility that it would not be uniformly applied. Hence, the most
certain solution would be an amendment to the statute incorporating
this restitutory concept of benefit.
4.

The Role of Negligence

The above discussion suggests that a cardholder would not often
be protected by the limited liability provisions for purchases made
by a person having authorized control of the holder's card. Among
the policy considerations supporting this conclusion is the fact that
the cardholder's initial relinquishment of control provides the occasion for the subsequent misuse. Transfers of control that are not
purely voluntary raise similar questions as to whether lesser degrees
of cardholder participation in a transfer justify the imposition of
full liability upon him. For example, when an unauthorized user
comes into control of the card after it has been lost or misplaced
by the cardholder, it might be argued that the cardholder has contributed to the subsequent financial loss to the extent that he failed
to exercise reasonable care in protecting the card. A similar "con186. See South, supra note 185, at 236-37.
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tribution" to loss may arise from the cardholder's failure to act in a
reasonable manner in notifying the issuer of loss or theft. The
question raised by these possibilities is whether there is some degree
of cardholder negligence that removes the protection of the statutory
limited-liability provisions in the event of loss or theft. The statute
provides no definitive guide to the resolution of this question. 187
But, while the limited-liability provisions received little attention
in the hearings and floor debate, the broad objectives and manner
of implementation of the limitation afford a basis for defining the
consequences of cardholder negligence.
In other statutory schemes, an individual's failure to give prompt
notice following loss has particular significance. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, for example, a customer who receives a bank
statement of his checking account that includes forged items "must
exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the statement
and items to discover [forgeries and alterations] and must notify the
bank promptly after discovery thereof." 188 While it has been argued
that a cardholder should be bound to a similar duty of notification,189
the limited-liability scheme does not appear to adopt this approach,
although it does address the consequences of delayed notification of
loss. As noted above, the statutory provisions encourage the cardholder to notify the issuer immediately following loss or theft: while
his maximum liability is othenvise fifty dollars, prompt notification
may limit actual liability to a lesser sum-the amount of unauthorized purchases made before notice. 100 At the same time, the statute
187. A close reading of the statute indicates not only an absence of language
dealing with the significance of a card loss resulting from the negligence of the
cardholder, but also some mild inconsistency in the loss events that are identified as
subject to the &tatute. For example, it is provided that the issuer must supply a
prcstamped, self-addressed loss notification form to be used "in the event of loss or
theft of the credit card." 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970) (emphasis added), On the other
hand, the cardholder has liability only for unauthorized use occurring before he has
notified the issuer that such a use may occur "as a result of loss, the/t, or otherwise."
Id. (emphasis added). Finally, the criminal sanction for misuse of a credit card applies
to any "counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen, or fraudulently obtained
credit card." 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1970) (emphasis added).
188. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4--406(1). This can be compared with section
8-405(1), which provides that where a security has been lost, apparently destroyed, or
wrongfully taken, the owner fails to notify the issuer of that fact within a reasonable
time after he has notice of it, and the issuer registers a transfer of the security before re•
ceiving notification, the owner is precluded from asserting any claim against the
issuer for registering a transfer of the security or any claim to a new security,
189. See :Bergsten, supra note 2, at 507.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. Congress apparently under•
stood that this scheme of inc~nUy1,3 would appropriately stimulate the dcs.trcd :(esponse.
See text at note 145 supra,
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imposes liability upon all who fail to meet the time restnctlon
without regard to the quality of their conduct; those who are unaware of the opportunity to limit liability further are treated the
same as those who consciously choose not to provide notice. Not only
is the statute silent on the impact of the motive or excuse for inaction, but the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency rejected
a proposed modification that would have further penalized a particular variety of cardholder neglect.191 The injection of negligence
principles is therefore an interference with the congressional design.
Because the statute directly confronts the problem of delayed notice
and provides a complete system for allocating loss, this should be
regarded as the exclusive mechanism for loss distribution.
Many of the considerations militating against increased cardholder liability for a negligent failure to give notice of loss also
suggest that the cardholder's negligence in the initial loss of the card
does not affect the availability of statutory protection. The statutory
language, for example, places no qualification on the type of card
loss that will be protected, but instead is absolute in its application.
Moreover, with respect to both types of negligence, the apparent
congressional choice was in favor of a system of specifically defined
liability limits. Such a system has the advantage of certainty for both
the issuer and cardholder and, to the extent it is readily administrable, ensures effectuation of congressional policy. If exceptions
were made for various degrees of negligent conduct, several undesirable results would follow. An approach based on negligence would
not, for example, allay cardholder concern for potential liability
from credit card use because cardholders would continue to have
only imprecise guides for determining their potential liability. 192
Moreover, the resultant disputes over the proper classification of the
cardholder's conduct invite overstatement and coercion by an issuer
attempting to maximize recovery. Consumer uncertainty is mini191. The Committee minority had suggested that protection from liability not be
extended to a person who had "purposely refrained from informing the issuer of
misuse about which he had actual knowledge." S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1970). This proposal was not accepted, and the Committee-endorsed measure made no
inroads on the breadth of statutory coverage.
192. Senator Proxmire, the sponsor of the bill, expressed particular concern for the
"psychological burden" that the threat of liability places on an individual. 116 CONG.
REc. 11829 (1970). While this remark was made in specific reference to unwanted
unsolicited cards, a similar concern seems implicit in the attempt to limit potential
liability of all cards. For example, the floor amendment that shifted the burden of
proving liability to the issuer was regarded as a necessary complement to the limited•
liability provision's objective of relieving the cardholder of inconvenience, expense, and
injury to his credit standing. Id. at 11831 (remarks of Senator McIntyre).
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mized if the liability system provides a clear standard for loss allocation. Finally, because of the legal nature of determining acceptable
cardholder conduct, a fault system would attract the intervention of
attorneys, and consequently increase the expenses incurred by cardholders.
The statute, if applied according to its literal terms, avoids these
results and allows cardholders to make a clear appraisal of the risks
of credit card use. The advantages of the limited-liability scheme
are found in the certainty of its apportionment of liability. The
introduction of fault concepts would substantially impede the progress that otherwise could be made toward reducing the potential
for inconvenience and expense to which cardholders were formerly
exposed.
C. Implementation of the Statutory Scheme

In order to effectuate the limited-liability provisions, the credit
card statute is designed to inform cardholders about the manner by
which liability is determined under the new rules. The dissemination
of such information to cardholders is desirable for a number of reasons. A basic concern, of course, is that cardholders not reimburse
issuers for amounts in excess of the statutory limits. This objective
could not be achieved by reliance solely on issuer self-enforcement
of the liability limitation. If a cardholder voluntarily paid for unauthorized charges on the assumption that he was liable for them,
the issuer may not have any means by which to identify the unnecessary payment since, without cardholder notification, the issuer
would often be unable to recognize unauthorized transactions.103
Sole reliance on the issuer's observance of the statutory limitation also
creates the risk that the issuer will not interpret and apply the statute
with proper concern for the protection that Congress intended to
afford cardholders. While provision is made for administrative con193. The risk of a voluntary, but unnecessary, payment by a cardholder seems
particularly great when the unauthorized use is made by a relative or employee of
the cardholder. The cardholder may assume that his relationship to, and perhaps
control over, the unauthorized user in these cases make him responsible for charges
incurred. Whether that is the case under the statute, however, depends ultimately on
the establishment of an agency relationship concerning use of the card itself. Even
with some information about the statute, the cardholder may still not be equipped
to make a knowledgeable assessment of his liability in these cases, particularly when
the issuer does not attempt to define "unauthorized use,'' as he is not required to do
under Federal Reserve System guidelines. See 36 Fed. Reg. 1041 (1971). An awareness
of the basic operation of the liability limitation should, however, increase the likelihood
that the cardholder will dispute his liability for charges made by others and avoid an
unquestioning reimbursement of the issuer.
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trols that could prevent overreaching by issuers,104 most controversies
arising under the statute will be settled informally between cardholder and issuer. The cardholder who is equipped with some information about the statute will be in a better position to protect his
interest without resorting to more expensive, and perhaps even unnecessary, procedures. Even when the issuer has taken the steps necessary to impose limited liability after loss of a card, the cardholder
may be able to reduce his potential liability still further simply by
notifying the issuer; he need not notify individual merchants nor
attempt to retrieve the card. Moreover, the cardholder informed
about the Act need not incur the inconvenience of giving notice of
loss when such notice is unnecessary to prevent liability-for example,
when the issuer has not complied with the prerequisites to imposition
of limited cardholder liability. It is likely, of course, that the cardholder will eventually notify a noncomplying issuer of the loss of a
card, if for no other reason than to have his account corrected and
a new card issued. But if he appreciates the protection offered by the
statute, the cardholder may be able to do so in a manner minimizing
his personal inconvenience.
Unfortunately, although issuers are assigned a primary role in
disseminating information about the operation of the liability limitation, issuer participation in the information system is not mandatory. In the congressional design, the opportunity to impose liability
up to fifty dollars is intended to provide the necessary incentive for
issuer compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Act. The
issuer might comply with the statute for two possible reasons: (1)
to limit its own financial loss by assessing its cardholders for their
maximum liability under the statute, or (2) to use the threat of
potential liability to prompt the cardholder to exercise care in the
control of his card and to notify the issuer in the event of loss.
Further analysis suggests that the first consideration is not likely to
be important to most issuers and that the impact of the second is
uncertain at best. The consequence is that the statutory objective
will not be readily achieved, and cardholders will continue to endure
some of the detrimental consequences that flow from an imperfect
perception of their liability for unauthorized card use.
An issuer's eagerness to assess cardholders a portion of its fraud
losses will be influenced by indirect as well as direct economic considerations. Experience prior to the statute is instructive in this re194. 15

u.s.c.

§ 1607 (1970).
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gard. Issuers commonly framed cardholder agreements to impose
cardholder liability for all unauthorized charges incurred prior to
the receipt of notice by the issuer of the loss or theft of a card. 10u
Yet, apparently few issuers took advantage of the right of recovery
that they had preserved in the cardholder agreement. One indication
of issuer hesitancy to hold cardholders liable for fraud losses is the
infrequency with which issuer collection actions ultimately resulted
in judicial decisions. Although credit cards and related devices have
existed since the early part of the century, the number of cases considering the issue of cardholder liability is small. By 1967 there
were only twenty reported decisions196 and few have appeared since
then. 197 The absence of reported decisions, of course, does not necessarily establish that issuers did not attempt collections by measures
short of litigation, a possibility that requires further analysis.
While there is evidence that some issuers did attempt to secure
reimbursement from cardholders, the extent of these practices was
probably limited, despite contrary suggestions. 198 The hearings on the
195. See text accompanying note 136 supra.
196. See llergsten, supra note 2, at 488-97, for a review of the cases.
197. See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1086 (1967) & Supp. (1971) at 17-18.
198. One commentator concluded: "Apparently about half of the issuers try to
recover and are successful in 30 to 50 per cent of their attempts." Note, supra note
100, at 1426 n.49. The author cites an interview with a New Haven issuer and an
empirical study at the University of Miami: Murray, supra note 185, at 830, The
author of a subsequent article states: "Estimates of collections on unpaid credit card
debts without suit vary from 30% to 50%." Kennedy, supra note 33, at 32, This
author's sources are the same as those of the earlier Note.
The results of the University of Miami study, conducted by Professor Daniel E.
Murray, are at best inconclusive on this question. The survey included responses from
several types of issuers. The responses of nine oil companies were summarized as
follows:
In response to the author's inquiry as to what percentage of holders have paid
voluntarily and what percentage did so after suit was filed • • • only two
companies attempted an answer. One company reported that approximately 30
per cent of its holders made payment for unauthorized charges without suit
being filed, while the other company said that 2 per cent of its holders paid
without suit being filed and less than 1 per cent did so after suit was filed,
Murray, supra note 185, at 830. The report on the four airlines that responded to the
survey was: "One airline reported that approximately 50 percent of its card l1oldcrs
voluntarily paid for unauthorized charges without any suit being filed." Id. at 833, Five
independent issuers (American E.xpress Co., General Electric Credit Corp., Carte
lllanche Corp., Diners' Club and Playboy Clubs Intl.) were surveyed. The author
reported: "Two of these companies stated that approximately one half of their holders
paid for unauthorized charges made against their cards before trial and the remaining
one half after trial." Id. at 834. In each group of respondents, some firms did not give
an answer to the specific question.
It was not determined whether the percentage of the firms that attempted collec•
tions was representative of industry practice. Other sources report that most issuers
did not pursue this practice. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 6. Moreover,
the survey did not determine whether firms that pursued collection efforts attempted
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credit card legislation did not include a detailed inquiry into these
industry practices, and other sources yield no conclusive data on the
matter. There are, however, a number of instances in which industry
representatives and others have recognized that issuers typically did
not attempt to charge cardholders for unauthorized uses.199 Credit
card firms explain this ·willingness to absorb fraud losses in terms of
protecting customer good will. The adverse publicity resulting from
a rigorous enforcement policy is likely to have a significant effect on
the issuer's competitive position, especially if other issuers adhere
to a policy of not assessing fraud losses against their cardholders.
Such publicity would also heighten the general awareness of the
dangers of credit card use, thereby adversely affecting the public's
receptiveness to credit cards.200 Equally significantly, collection techniques involving litigation or significant manpower expenditures
probably cannot be justified by issuers in most cases because the
amount of loss is small.201 The collective impact of these considerations led most issuers to absorb their fraud losses, despite the continued use of agreement terms purporting to relieve the cardholder
of liability only after notice.
In light of the industry practice that prevailed, it would seem
that few issuers will take the required statutory steps solely in order
to shift a portion of their fraud losses to cardholders. An issuer's
compliance with the statutory requirements would result in additional costs,202 while the issuer's potential recovery is now limited
to a maximum of fifty dollars. Those issuers who previously chose
them in all cases. Considerations such as the size of the cardholder's account balance
and his propensity toward a retaliatory suit suggest that such action would sometimes
be imprudent.
199. Many issuers took this position in the congressional hearings. See, e.g., 1970
House Hearings, supra note 14, at 91 (testimony of Earl Pollock, Midwest Bank Card
System, Inc.); id. at 215 (statement of Clifford Venarde, Shell Oil Co.). See also 1968
Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 2, 4-5 (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System); South, supra note 185, at 226.
200. The credit manager of an oil company reported: "Every time the papers report
customer losses on stolen credit cards we get hundreds of credit cards returned to us."
1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 217, 218 reprinting NATL. PETROLEUM NEWS,
April 1967.
201. In a survey of several large oil companies, it was found that the amount of
unauthorized charges against lost cards averaged $151. One issuer (a bank) indicated
that it experienced only a $38 average loss. See Murray, supra note 185, at 829, 836.
202. The issuer must draft, publish, and distribute both the required notices and
the self-addressed, prestamped loss notification form. In addition, new security systems
must be devised to handle card returns, inquiries, and requests for replacement cards.
Moreover, many issuers would have to develop a new format for their cards in order
to meet the statutory requirement of inclusion of a reasonable identification device.
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not to press for cardholder liability are not likely to incur additional
costs solely to preserve a right to a recovery that they did not intend
to exercise. Similarly, those few issuers who sought reimbursement
from cardholders will now be discouraged from such action by the
limitation placed on the potential recovery. Without the likelihood
of a recovery sufficient to cover collection costs, formal enforcement
actions are unlikely, and measures short of litigation should also be
curtailed.
Even absent an expectation of shifting some portion of fraud
losses to cardholders, an issuer will be concerned that cardholders
both protect their cards from loss and give notice in the event of their
loss. This kind of care could be encouraged if the issuer satisfied
the limited-liability requirements to continue the threat of potential
liability in the event of unauthorized use. But it is possible that the
desired cardholder care might be forthcoming even if an issuer does
not meet the statutory prerequisites for limited cardholder liability.
Issuers have made a concerted effort to foster the notion among
cardholders that liability may attend the loss of a credit card,208 and
this notion is likely to linger despite the enactment of S. 721. Even
apart from this consideration, issuers would have the benefit of a
natural tendency among cardholders to approach their financial
dealings with a concern for potential injury.204 Absent clear information to the contrary, a cardholder's probable reaction to the loss
of his card will be one of concern. While the cardholder may be
uncertain about his legal liability for unauthorized charges, the
situation is likely to be viewed as calling for protective measures;
the most logical step to minimize the prospects of liability is to inform the issuer of the loss of the card.
In evaluating whether to incur the cost of providing cardholders
with information about the statute, the issuer must assess the extent
to which it may otherwise be the beneficiary of a cardholder's
natural or industry-generated concern for potential liability. The
issuer may not always decide that its interests are protected without
compliance with the statute, for the relevant factors are not suscep203. See text accompanying notes 136-37 supra.
204. It has been recognized by enforcement personnel that issuers might attempt
to rely on a tendency among cardholders to overestimate their potential liability and,
hence, to avoid disclosure of the operation of the statute. Staff members "at the FTC's
Division of Consumer Credit and Special Programs say that most companies have a lot
to gain by keeping their customers uninformed. If a cardholder knows that his
liability is limited to $50, for example, he may not be so prompt in letting the com•
pany know when he finds that his card is missing." TIME, Sept. 13, 1971, at 80.
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tible to precise definition. In addition, if the desired response is not
forthcoming from its cardholders, the risk that the issuer faces is
substantial. The point is that the issuers' responses will reflect the
incentives that the statute provides. Because the incentives that
Congress created are not strong, the degree of issuer compliance
will be uneven. Unless the disclosure system is restructured, many
issuers will choose not to take advantage of the opportunity to impose limited liability on cardholders. They will be content to create
the impression of potential liability and thereby stimulate cardholders to protect their cards, but stop short of doing all that would
technically be necessary to impose liability. Hence, issuer disclosure
of information about the statute may be limited to a cursory statement of potential liability.205 Even those issuers who choose to meet
the statutory requirements are not likely to regard their compliance
as requiring any immediate action; the timing of the statutory disclosures might be geared to other changes in the issuer's program, such
as the redesign or reissuance of cards.
The response of credit card companies since the enactment of the
credit card provisions confirms that the statute provides at best a
limited incentive for issuer participation in the information dis205. The response of one major oil company illustrates this type of situation. The
issuer distributed information intended to correct statements on its outstanding cards
to the effect that the cardholder had liability for all unauthorized charges made prior
to notification of loss. The issuer's disclosure took this form:
IMPORTANT NOTICE
CHANGE IN CREDIT CARD AGREEMENT
You may have a credit card which, contrary to the provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act, overstates your liability for the unauthorized use of your card.
All provisions appearing on your credit card which impose liability in excess of
that imposed by the terms of the Truth in Lending Act are hereby deleted. Your
liability for unauthorized use under the Truth in Lending Act can, in no event,
exceed $50.00.
American Oil Co., Notice, November 1971, on file with the Michigan Law Review. This
disclosure is not sufficient to permit the issuer to impose any liability on cardholders.
It fails to make clear the "pertinent facts" about the operation of the statute, as is
required by the Truth-in-Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1602G) (1970), set out in note 34
supra. The cardholder is not told the circumstances in which his liability may be less
than fifty dollars. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. Moreover,
while the issuer distributed a notification-of-loss form, it was not prestamped as
required by the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970). Although the statement of maximum
liability is a correct generalization about the Act, it does not accurately assess the cardholder's liability; he bears no liability in any amount for the unauthorized use of this
issuer's cards. But it may be unimportant to the issuer that it will not be able to
recover from its cardholders. Its disclosure will cause most cardholders to believe that
some liability may be imposed; hence, they will be likely to exercise care with their
card and to give notice to the issuer in the event of loss in order to minimize that
perceived liability.

1534

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1475

semination scheme. In the first year following enactment of the
statute, only a very few firms gave any public recognition to the
new rules for determining cardholder liability. This delayed initial
reaction occurred even though the consequence to noncomplying
issuers was the elimination of any right to demand notice from cardholders or reimbursement for unauthorized charges. Since the initial
period, the number of issuers distributing information about the
statute has increased.200 Nevertheless, it remains clear that many
issuers still prefer to operate without preserving their right to impose liability within the statutory limits. Their response is evidently
not evoked by the statute's supposed incentive.
206. An informal survey, by the author, of thirty issuers indicates that in the first
year after enactment, only two took steps to comply with the conditions for imposing
limited liability on cardholders. An additional ten issuers have since distributed
information about the statute, but in only four of these additional cases was the
disclosure sufficient to impose liability on the cardholder. In the other situations, the
disclosure was intended to point out the invalidity of statements on the issuers' cards
that purported to impose greater liability on the cardholder than is permitted under
the statute.
The survey included four cards issued by retail department stores. Interestingly,
none of these issuers had responded to the statute, although other classes of issuers
were not as uniform. While the survey is sufficiently unscientific to render any
generalizations suspect, it may be that many relatively small retailer-issuers wci:e not
responding to the statute because of the greater cost per unit of compliance and
their greater control over the security of their cards resulting from the limited
number of outlets at which they were accepted.
A similarly unsystematic, but perhaps somewhat more comprehensive, survey was
conducted among issuers of bank cards. These results confirm an absence of enthusiasm
among banks to take steps to impose liability on cardholders. Between forty and fifty
banks in the twelve Federal Reserve Districts were asked if they were aware of
instances in which a bank attempted to assess the fifty-dollar liability limit against a
credit card user. In all but two districts, there were no reported instances of collection
attempts. In those districts where enforcement activity was reported, action was taken
by only a few banks. Brimmer Paper, supra note 45, at 20-26.
The report of this survey does not clearly specify whether the banks had chosen
not to satisfy the statutory requisites for imposing limited liability, or whether they
had made the necessary disclosures but then decided not to seek the recovery allowed
by the statute. Several responses suggest that the banks had not complied with the
requirements. In the Dallas district, for example, it was reported that "[i)n general,
little has been done to formulate a policy for operating under the $50 rule of the
October 26 legislation. Typically, the legislation has not resulted in any change in
banks' operations with respect to unauthorized use of credit cards." Id. at 25. Similarly,
only one bank in the New York district "is sending a pre-printed notification form to
customers as required by the amendment to Regulation Z." Id. at 22,
A number of reasons are identified for the banks' decision to absorb fraud losses.
In one district "public relations and other competitive reasons" were cited. Id. at 22. In
the Richmond district, "it appears to be the consensus among banks that attempting
to assess the loss will probably not be worth the cost in the long run." Id. at 24.
An inquiry by the Federal Trade Commission further confirmed the failure of the
statute to attract widespread issuer participation. "According to the FTC, none of the
major card companies have presented evidence that it is complying with the provisions
of (the statute]." TIME, Sept. 13, 1971, at 78. Plans by some large issuers to infonn
their cardholders of the act were noted, however. Id. at 80.
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In other cases, even after enactment of the statute, many issuers
continued to distribute materials that stated conditions of cardholder liability in the same terms used prior to the statute.207 These
provisions overstating the cardholder's potential liability were not
enforceable under the statute, but neither was their inclusion in
agreements specifically prohibited. The continued dissemination of
this information, however, did create the risk that cardholders might
unnecessarily reimburse the issuer for losses, and thus is contrary to
the spirit of a statute intended to place cardholder liability within
well-defined limits. Apparently recognizing that this conflict might
lead to administrative regulation, some issuers have undertaken
to correct the erroneous impression fostered by credit card agreements. 208
These attempts to correct clearly erroneous statements, even if
made without an intention to meet the statutory prerequisites for
cardholder liability, still have the desirable effect of increasing cardholder awareness of the statute. There are, however, obvious difficulties with a situation in which the consumer is given information
that contradicts his credit card agreement. In most cases, the disclaimer of liability did not have the same prominence as the improper language, as the correcting language was often in a form
neither as durable nor as noticeable as the announcement of liability
printed on the card itself. Consequently, the issuer's original overstatement of liability may continue to have some effect, and thus
perpetuate consumer acceptance of a liability system that the statute
legally reverses. Another risk, perhaps less systematic in nature, is
that the information conveyed by the disclaimer will give an incomplete description of the operation of the statute. As is suggested
by the disclaimer forms actually used by some issuers, the cardholder
may be prompted to take action that is not required by the statute,
either in making reimbursement or giving notice. 209
207. In most cases, the continued distribution of these statements was probably a
result of attempts by issuers to exhaust existing supplies of cards and cardholder
agreements, which had been prepared prior to passage of the statute.
208. E.g., disclosure of American Oil Co., supra note 205. See also note 206 supra.
209. For example, one of the two major bank credit franchises has distributed a
printed form that advises recipients to disregard a legend on its credit cards stating
that the cardholder bears full liability for all unauthorized uses that occur prior to
notification of loss or theft of a card. The form also sets out the statutory requirements
for imposing partial liability on the cardholder. The form fails to state, however,
whether the issuer has complied with the terms of the statute. Master Charge Disclosure Form, September 1971, on file with the Michigan Law Review. See also note
205 supra.
Cardholders receiving this information are likely to be confused about the extent
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This type of confusion is understandable during the period immediately following adoption of the statute since outstanding cards
and literature had been drafted on the basis of prestatutory law.
But even allowing for an issuer's desire to use up existing supplies
of materials, the likely encroachment upon the statutory design by
the continued distribution of contradictory materials provides a basis
for concern. The Federal Reserve Board eventually issued an informal ruling that designated January 25, 1972, as the cut-off date
for the distribution of credit card materials that misstated cardholder
liability; 210 in a subsequent clarification, it stated that the mere
inclusion of a corrective statement would not be sufficient to validate the use of dated materials.211 No action has yet been taken to
require the recall of outstanding cards that misstate liability; it is
apparently expected that normal attrition through expiration and
reissuance of current cards will eventually lead to the elimination
of these materials.212
A matter of more enduring concern is the absence of a provision
making mandatory the disclosure of information about the liability
limitations. The statute permits the issuer to leave the cardholder
without any indication of his responsibility either to give notice of
loss or to reimburse the issuer for the fraudulent use of his card.
The operation of the statute in this regard is somewhat curious for
it seems to reflect a basic inconsistency in the apparent legislative
policy underlying the provision. On the one hand, Congress recognized that it is not enough to change the rules for cardholder liability without informing cardholders of the new loss-allocation system.
Yet, at the same time, this recognition is given only limited expression since an issuer is required to explain the limits of its right to
of their liability. The manner in which this information is presented may lead some
cardholders to believe that the fifty-dollar liability applies to them, The statement may
therefore prompt cardholders to give the issuer notification of loss to which it is not
entitled. In other cases, the cardholder may unquestioningly reimburse the issuer for
unauthorized charges of less than fifty dollars. To the extent that issuers encourage-even unintentionally-this gratuitous response by cardholders, the statutory design
is frustrated.
210. See 4 CCH CONSUMER. CREDIT GUIDE 11 30,740 (1971) (excerpts from Fed Res, 13d.
opinion letter of Oct. 15, 1971, No. 528, by J. L. Robertson).
211. See id. 11 30,778 (1972) (excerpts from Fed. Res. 13d. letter of Dec. 1971, No,
557, by Griffith L. Garwood).
212. Some issuers, particularly small ones such as department stores, do not have
systematic reissuance programs. Misstatements of liability for these issuers arc likely
to endure. Even in cases in which the issuer follows a yearly renewal program, cards
that incorrectly state cardholder liability may have continued in circulation for two
and one-half years after the effective date of the new statutory liability provisions,
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impose cardholder liability only if it desires to preserve that right.
The determinant of the availability of information to the cardholder
is the issuer's assessment of the desirability of preserving an option·
to impose limited liability. Notably, this calculus does not necessarily bear any direct relation to the cardholder's need for information. Even in situations where the law provides that no portion of
an unauthorized charge may be assessed against him, the cardholder
needs this information in order to adjust his response to the fraudulent use of his card.
The goal of preventing unnecessary cardholder responses may be
achieved without the participation of all issuers in the disclosure
scheme. Knowledge of the statute acquired from one issuer's disclosure can be applied to situations involving other issuers. But a
number of conditions must first be present. Most importantly, a
great number of issuers would have to disclose the required information in a form indicating the general applicability of the liability
rules. Furthermore, by virtue of the structure of the disclosure system, issuers who choose to deliver the required information have no
reason to indicate that the cardholder would have had no liability
if the disclosure had not been made. Thus, when cardholders receive
a statement about the applicability of the statute, it will be framed
only in terms of a positive identification of liability. There is no
incentive for an issuer to identify the extent to which its announced
liability rules are applicable to transactions involving the cards of
other issuers. In light of these factors and the absence of a uniform
disclosure form, a cardholder may not recognize the applicability
of the statutory controls to credit cards generally.
The presence of credit card arrangements that are silent about
the liability rules applicable in the event of misuse continues the
risk of unnecessary cardholder action and expense. A minor modification of the statutory provision can ensure that this risk is substantially alleviated. Each issuer should be required to inform cardholders
of the liability rules that apply in the event of an unauthorized
transaction. Thus, issuers who choose not to preserve the option of
imposing limited liability would be required to explicitly inform
the cardholder that no adverse economic consequences result from
the misuse of his card. It is assumed that many issuers would oppose
such a disclosure because of a fear of encouraging laxity among cardholders in the care of cards, and out of concern for the loss that might
occur if cardholders failed to inform them of the loss of a card. Such
an attitude by issuers may be quite desirable as a policy matter:
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these are the concerns that Congress assumed would operate to
prompt issuers to preserve their right to impose limited liability
and to disseminate information about the statute. Only if issuers
are made to confront these pressures directly is the statute likely to
operate in accordance with the apparent congressional design. Rather
than risk cardholder carelessness in card use, issuers would take
advantage of the opportunity to create an economic incentive for the
desired cardholder care by fulfilling the requisites for the imposition
of limited liability.213
D.

The Effect of State Statutes and Cardholder Agreements
on Cardholder Liability

In a provision added during the floor debate, the new federal
credit card law provides that the amount of cardholder liability will
be governed by any "other applicable law or ... agreement with
the card issuer" that sets liability at less than fifty dollars. 214 This
invitation to look for liability limitations in other sources is likely
to have limited practical impact. But in a few situations in which
other limitations are applicable, potentially complex interpretive
problems may obfuscate the desired objective of readily ascertainable
liability limits.
Several issuers have long observed the practice of stating a specific dollar limitation on cardholder liability in the cardholder agreement. The liability ceilings, however, have generally been higher
than the maximum established by the federal enactment.21u Industry
representatives commenting on S. 721, while generally receptive to
the concept of a liability limitation, questioned the effectiveness of
a fifty-dollar ceiling and urged adoption of a greater amount. 210
213. Of course, if a disclosure of nonliability were compelled, some cardholders who
have no liability at present would therefore be exposed to the potential fifty-dollar
liability as issuers chose instead to comply with the statutory requirements for recovery,
In practice, however, these issuers are not likely to enforce their rights to receive reimbursement. In any case, a judgment might properly be made that cardholders should
not be left without adequate information about the statute, the result that is per•
petuated under present law.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(c) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. See 116 CoNc. REc. 11830
(1970) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
215. Examples of liability limits imposed by several companies arc American Express Co.-$100, cited in Macaulay, supra note 136, at 1114 &: Bergsten, supra note 2,
at 504; Diners' Club-$100, cited in Bergsten, id.; Shell Oil Co.-$100, cited in 1970
House Hearings, supra note 14, at 225, 226 (submission of W. J. Bittles, Jr., General
Manager of Retail Marketing, Shell Oil Co.).
216. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 225, 227 (submission of W. J.
Bittles, Jr., General Manager of Retail Marketing, Shell Oil Co., urging a $100 ceiling); 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 103, 106 (statement of Thomas Bailey,
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Absent a significant change in fraud loss experience, it is doubtful
that issuers would now move to a lower self-imposed limit.
A few states have adopted statutory limitations on cardholder
liability. 217 The majority of these will have little effect because the
dollar amount specified either equals or exceeds that of the federal
statute.218 Yet, in some of the situations in which a state enactment
might control allocation of liability, the lower limitation is qualified
so as to add a new level of complexity to the determination of cardholder rights. Under the Illinois statute, for example, the cardholder's
maximum liability increases with the greater reliability of the issuer's
identification technique. Cardholder liability cannot exceed twentyfive dollars in situations where the issuer has failed to provide a
American Bankers Association, urging a $100 ceiling); id. at 123, 125, 127 (statement of
Edward J. McNeal, American Retail Federation). But see 118 CoNG. REc:. 11830 (1970)
(remarks of Senator Proxmire, reporting a $25 ceili~g applied by a ''large New York
bank'').
217. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.20 (West Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121½,
§ 382 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3927 (Supp. 1972);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255, § 12E(3) (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 325.932 (Supp.
1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:IOA-3 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-19-4 {Supp.
1971); N.Y. GEN. Bus. I.Aw § 512(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CoDE ANN.
§ 51.14.1-02 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-15-117 (Supp. 1971).
A number of state statutes absolve the intended cardholder of liability for the
unauthorized use of an unsolicited credit card before his acceptance or use of it. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.209 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2542 (Supp. 1970);
HAWAII REv. LAws § 730-12 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-618 (Supp. 1971): MD.
ANN. Co»E art. 83, § 21B (1969); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1319.01 (Anderson Supp.
1971); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 54;-11-4 (Supp. 1972); VA. CoDE ANN. § 11-31 (Supp.
1971); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.71 (Supp. 1972).
The federal statute achieves the same result, for a cardholder bears no liability
for an unauthorized use unless his card is an "accepted credit card," 15 U.S.C.
§ 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
Under the federal statute, a holder of an unsolicited, but accepted, card could have
liability up to fifty dollars in the event of its unauthorized use. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)
(1970), set out in note 34 supra. The statute. does not make .it explicit that this
limited liability applies only to unsolicited cards issued prior to the effective date of
the prohibition of unsolicited mailings. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra.
It can be argued that the definition of "accepted credit card" was intended only to
validate unsolicited cards outstanding at the time of enactment. Cards subsequently
issued in violation of the statute might be viewed as creating illegal contracts that are
not enforceable for any purpose. Withou~ such a rule, an issuer might be tempted .to
make an unsolicited distribution in the expectation that the cards would quickly be
"accepted," thus gaining an advantage the statute seeks to deny. A Rhode Island
statute that prohibits the mailing of unsolicited cards confronts this problem directly
by precluding the issuer "from maintaining any civil action for the recovery of any
debt created through the use of' an unsolicited card. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 6-30-4
(Supp. 1971).
.
218. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3927 (Supp. 1972) ($50); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 255, § 12E(3) (Supp. 1971) ($50); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.932 (Supp. 1972)
($50); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:lOA-3 (Supp. 1972) ($50); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-19-4 (Supp.
1971) ($50); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 512(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971) (incorporates federal
limit); N.D. CENT. CODE .ANN.§ 51.14.1-02 (Supp. 1971) ($100).
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signature panel on the card.219 However, since under the federal
statute a means of identifying the holder must be included on the
credit card as a prerequisite to imposing limited liability,220 the
Illinois statute will prevail only until the federal statute is fully
implemented.221
The liability limitations in the California and Tennessee statutes
have a more enduring effect. Both are significant because they relieve the cardholder from all liability for unauthorized use if he
promptly notifies the issuer of his loss. 222 Although the apparent
intent of the federal scheme was to abandon fault concepts in favor
of a system of specifically defined liability,223 its deference to statutes
such as those in California and Tennessee reintroduces the question
of the quality of the cardholder's action. The California statute requires nonnegligent conduct at two important stages: not only must
notification be within a reasonable period of time after discovery
of the loss, but the delay in the discovery must also not exceed that
which "a reasonable man in the exercise of ordinary care" would
have experienced.224 In addition to requiring prompt notification,
the Tennessee provision absolves the cardholder of liability only if
he "exercises reasonable care in [the] use and safekeeping" of his
219. h.L. ANN. STAT, ch. 121½, § 382(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972). Originany, a llabltity ceiling of seventy-five doUars was provided if the card had a signature panel. [1967]
Ill. Laws 365, § 2 Only 27, 1967). The graduated system of issuer liability was intended
to encourage issuers to resort to more reliable identification techniques. The fifty-dollar
ceiling of the federal statute took precedence, and the Illinois statute was amended by
P.A. 77-1637, [1971) Ill. Laws 2580, § I (Sept. 24, 1971) to limit maximum liability to
fifty dollars.
New York had a provision with a graduated ceiling similar to the lllinois statute.
See ch. 998, § 5 N.Y. Laws 3103, 3104-05 (May 19, 1970), In 1971, this was replaced by a
measure incorporating the limitations of the federal statute, N.Y. GEN, Dus. LAW § 512
(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
220, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra.
221. The Illinois statute will only affect losses arising prior to Jan. 24, 1972, and
then only if the cards involved were issued prior to the effective date of the federal
statute. This result fol)ows because aU issuers desiring to impose any liability at all
must provide some means of identification on the card. Cards newly issued after the
effective date of the limited-liability provision, Jan. 24, 1971, must meet this standard,
while cards that were outstanding on that date must meet the identification standard
one year later. 36 Fed. Reg. 1041 (1971). The twenty-five-dollar limitation of the
Illinois statute for cards with no means of identification will then be obsolete.
222. See CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1747.20 (West Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-15-117
(Supp. 1971). If the cardholder fails to give the necessary notice, his liability cannot
exceed fifty doUars under the California statute, The Tennessee enactment establishes
a one hundred doUar liability ceiling if no notice is given. This limitation is no longer
effective, and the cardholder's liability will be defined by the fifty dollar limitation of
the federal statute.
223. See text accompanying notes 187-92 supra.
224. CAL. C1v. CoDE § 1747.20 (West. Supp. 1972).
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card.225 The utilization of these flexible standards lessens the certainty of statutory application and increases both the cardholder's
difficulty in assessing his liability and the issuer's opportunity for
overreaching. The relatively small amount of liability involved, however, diminishes the significance of these consequences and, thus,
the resultant disruption of the federal scheme.
An unresolved question is whether the deference to state liabilitylimiting rules extends to those arising from judicial interpretation.
Several cases decided prior to the enactment of the federal statute
developed the doctrine that a merchant had an obligation to exercise
care in accepting a credit card. 226 Thus, the cardholder was relieved
of liability for unauthorized purchases if the merchant failed to
question the identity or authority of the user when circumstances
suggested the appropriateness of such an inquiry. 227 Injection of this
rule into the federal statutory scheme would further relieve cardholders of responsibility for unauthorized uses of their cards. What is
uncertain, however, is whether "other applicable law," as embodied
in the federal enactment, encompasses judicially pronounced rules.
Debate about the breadth of statutory incorporation of other
"law" has considerable historic significance, for this issue was at the
center of the controversy concerning the law to be applied by federal
judges in actions based solely on diversity of citizenship. The prevailing resolution, announced in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 228
is that a statutory reference to "the laws of the several states" encompasses both legislative and judicial pronouncements; yet, many
courts indicate a continuing willingness to conclude that in construing a particular statute purporting to incorporate state laws, only
legislative acts were intended to be incorporated. Legislative history,
225. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-15-117 (Supp. 1971).
226. See Duke v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 433 S.W.2d 919 (Te.x. Civ. App. 1968); Union
Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960); Allied Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Fupderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (New York City Ct. 1967). See also Gulf Ref. Co.
v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945). See generally Note, 43
N.C. L. R.Ev. 416 (1965); Recent Case, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 266 (1960).
227. Inquiry was found to be necessary when an unusually large number of purchases were made on the account in a short period of time. See Allied Stores of N.Y.,
Inc. v. Funderburke, 52 Misc, 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (New York City Ct. 1967); Duke
v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 433 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). Inquiry was also required
when there was a discrepancy between the state of the cardholder's residence as printed
on the card and the state of registration of the car for which petroleum products were
purchased. Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
228. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In question was the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789
providing "that the laws of the several states ••• shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
28 u.s.c. § 725 (1970).
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policy, and the contextual implications of a usage are frequently
employed to support the finding of such a limitation.220
Application of these guides to the federal credit card statute
suggests that only legislative enactments should be applied as further
limitations of cardholder liability. In introducing the amendment
that gave controlling effect to "other applicable law,'' Senator Proxmire observed that the bill was designed to accommodate state action
"intended to go beyond the Federal legislation and reduce the consumer's liability to less than $50.''280 While he did not indicate
specifically that he contemplated only legislative action, his remarks
were in the context of a discussion of existing state enactments,
suggesting that he understood the primary impact of the amendment
to be its incorporation of state statutory limitations. Also, the amendment sought to ensure that the new statute, intended to advance
consumer protection, did not actually increase the cardholder liability othenvise governed by more favorable loss-distribution mechanisms.281 The hearings suggest that the prevailing understanding
was that such mechanisms took the form of either statutory or contractual limitations.232 Consequently, it appears that the proponents
of the amendment had only these two types of restrictions in mind
when they moved for its enactment.
The congressional design for the new loss-distribution scheme
also supports the view that a merchant's negligence should not provide a further limitation on cardholder liability. Prior to the statute,
the decision to shift liability from the cardholder to the issuer as a
consequence of a merchant's negligence could be justified in order
to stimulate issuers to ensure that merchants exercised care in accepting credit cards. Since control of this type of loss more clearly
rested on the issuer than the cardholder, it seemed appropriate that
229. See In re Chicago Express, Inc., 332 F.2d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Am•
mond v. Pennsylvania R.R., 125 F.2d 747 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 691 (1942);
Wickes Boiler Co. v. Godfrey-Keeler Co., 121 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
686 (1941); Neff v. Hindman, 77 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
230. 116 CONG. REc. 11830 (1970).
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 66 (statement of Robert Meade,
Director, President's Committee on Consumer Interests); id. at 106-07 (statement of
Thomas Bailey, American Bankers Association); id. at 127 (discussion between Edward
J. McNeal, American Retail Federation, and Senator Proxmire), Discussions of existing
liability limitations typically included references only to state statutes and cardholdcr
agreements. E.g., id. at 66 (Massachusetts statute); id. at 106 (New York statute); id.
at 127 (Illinois statute). Judicially developed restrictions were not generally considered.
This was probably due in part to the limited number of decisions supporting such
limitations and the uncertainty of their impact.
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the issuer bear the costs of these transactions. 233 The enactment of
the federal credit card statute removes much of the force of this
justification since the issuer now bears the major responsibility for
fraud losses in any case. The prospect of liability for all unauthorized
charges in excess of fifty dollars should provide an adequate stimulant
for the issuer to take the steps that the prestatutory negligence rules
sought to promote.
Some doubt must remain as to the meaning of the incorporation
provision because the particular language used is broad, enough to
encompass a limiting law in any form. It seems preferable, however,
to accept the implications of the circumstances surrounding adoption
of the amendment. If only legislative acts were incorporated, another
potentially troublesome fault concept would be ·avoided with an
accompanying reduction in both the likelihood of protracted controversy and the need for professional interpretation. While this
approach may deny the cardholder an important weapon for avoiding the fifty-dollar liability in particular cases, such a result can be
accepted as a necessary consequence of the effort to establish a new
system of specific liability limitations.284
IV.

CONCLUSION

When Congress set out to reform the credit card industry, its
primary concern was with the implications of unsolicited distribution of such devices. The initial legislative proposals w'ere concerned
only with this practice, and the hearings gave only limited attention
to other issues. This is unfortunate because the other provisions of
the enactment-particularly those limiting cardholder · liabilitywill require much attention in their interpretation and application.
A more complete statement of the legislative understanding would
233. The fact that few issuers attempted to pass fraud losses on to individual cardholders limits the practical importance of this argument. The suggested justification,
however, does serve to explain those few cases in which merchant negligence was utilized as a loss-allocation principle.
234. Another aspect of the legislative history of S. 721 is relevant to the role of
issuer or merchant negligence in accepting a card in an unauthorized use. A proposed
modification in Committee would have required the issuer to inform the cardholder
that "the card issuer or his agent has a responsibility to assure that purchases made on
the card were made by the person identified on the card or a person authorized by
him." S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970). The reason for its rejection is not
clear, since the Committee deliberations are not reported. However, the fact that Congress apparently considered the idea that merchant negligence might further limit
cardholder liability-and did not modify the statute to incorporate it-may support
the inference that the statutory scheme was intended to operate without regard to the
care that merchants exercised in accepting cards from unauthorized 'users.
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have avoided some of the interpretive difficulties that the statute
presents.
.. In the absence of specific legislative direction, application of the
statute' will require resort to general policies. The statutory design
itself yields one. such principle. The liability limitation implicitly
recognizes the need not only to restructure legal rules to protect
consumers adequately, but also to ensure that consumers are given
information that will enable them to utilize the protections provided. ,Achievement of the goal of increasing consumer awareness
requires also that particular attention be given to the substance of
the new rules. An effort must be made to structure a loss-allocation
system that can be conveyed in understandable form. Hence, the
emphasis should be upon rules that carry readily discernible implications.l ,Does the federal credit card legislation have this quality? A
basic premise of this Article is that there are a number of features of
the statute-the reliance on agency concepts, the reference to the
cardholder benefit in the definition of unauthorized use, the undefined role of cardholder negligence-that have a potential for
interpretive complexity.
Cases raising these interpretive problems should be resolved in
a manner promoting consumer certainty by drawing clear distinctions between circumstances that give rise to full liability and those
to which the limited-liability provisions of the statute are applicable.
In' so d~ing, traditional legal principles of construction may occasio~!11ly be slighted, but this result must be accepted as a necessary
effect of the commitment to make the law more sensitive to the concern o~ a, consuming public.

